Guess what? The Earth ain't flat, and Paris ain’t its center of gravity either. We're republishing an interview with H.E. Kawlan Sibal that we conducted a year ago — what he had to say is still just as valid today. Better to listen to him than to any Parisian DJ.

Kanwal Sibal, president of Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi and former Foreign Secretary of the Republic of India, offers his insights into the trajectory of global affairs.

Kanwal Sibal is well-positioned—not to patronize, but to provide clarity—having held ambassadorial posts in Egypt, Russia, and France before taking on Indian diplomacy's top job. He witnessed up close the peak of the Cold War, the short-lived perception of American hegemony, the similarly transient "globalist" neocolonial vision that emerged with globalization, and the initial negotiations of what would eventually evolve into the BRICS.

As an ailing European Union squanders what little geostrategic credibility it has left through irrational stances and policies, Kanwal Sibal’s words ring profoundly true.

With that characteristically subtle Indian candor, is he suggesting that we in the West are, in essence, “ullu da patha” (literally “sons of owls,” meaning fools)? That we’re incapable of sensing the winds of change—the breath of the Qalandar—while eagerly embracing a Hollywood-style Indiana Jones version of Kali? That, to our own detriment, we’ve stopped trying to understand the world?

India, as has long been evident, is a demographic titan. Today, it stands as an economic, industrial, scientific, technological, and military powerhouse—a major global player that steadfastly refuses to assert itself aggressively. These 1.4 billion non-aligned friends are intriguing.

So let’s move beyond trading-post chatter in Pondichéry and listen to how we’re perceived—especially since, in India, no one harbors ill will toward the West. Our 1.4 billion non-aligned friends remain undeniably intriguing.

L'Eclaireur : Good morning, sir. Thank you so much for taking the time to speak with me. You were just in Moscow, I believe, last week. What was the atmosphere in the Russian capital?

Kanwal Sibal : Well, it seemed pretty normal. We had this conference, which was very well attended, huge crowds. We went around and walked a little bit—some of the old places where I used to walk before, obviously the Red Square and the area around. And generally, of course, we motored through large parts of Moscow because I had appointments here and there. So sitting there, you wouldn't get the impression that there is a war going on.

Though, of course, I must say that many of the Western shops which were there—let's say in GUM—they have bound up. You don't see them, whether it is French or German or Italian. Chinese presence is very prominent in GUM. There are a few Italian companies I wasn't familiar with that have taken the place of the Western companies that have departed.

To answer your question, the restaurants are full, the streets are full of traffic. I was told that Chinese vehicles have replaced the German cars and that you would not see Mercedes or BMWs or others. But I was a bit surprised—that’s not quite true. In fact, most of the cars I saw on the street, some of them are German, but there are also Japanese cars—Toyota and others.

Another thing I noticed was that, driving from the airport, you could see on the right side a whole line of Western auto showrooms. Now most of them, virtually all of them, have been replaced by Chinese car showrooms. Also, since I visited after some years, I saw many more high-rise modern buildings from the airport to the center. In the business district in Moscow, you see more skyscrapers. But in the heart—where you have the Red Square, the Bolshoi, and all that—things seem to be the same.

L'Eclaireur: So business as usual, I would say. Okay, what is your take on the bloody mess that is going on in Europe right now? I mean, from an Indian perspective—which is a perspective that unfortunately we do not hear much of back here in Europe—while I believe it is absolutely critical.

Kanwal Sibal: Well, if you ask me frankly, it's very difficult to understand why Europe is doing what it is doing. In the sense that Europe has always prided itself—and until recently quite legitimately—on having overcome the enmities of the past. Europe was a haven of peace, a value proposition rather than a security proposition. The security issues had largely been settled between European countries, and the wars and enmities of the past had been overcome.

Europe was in the business of projecting to the world its commitment to peace, social harmony, and welfare—a stable and peaceful world order. But now, Europe’s calling card as a haven of peace lacks credibility altogether.

Because when Trump, for whatever reason, is looking for some way out of the conflict—trying to end the conflict, reach out to Russia, promote a peaceful solution—Europe is doing its very best to prevent that from happening. They want to prolong the conflict, and they have not moved away at all from their previous rhetoric about Russia being a danger to Europe. In fact, they’ve aggravated that narrative by claiming that if Russia succeeds in Ukraine, the next target will be either Poland or the Baltic states—even Western Europe.

That’s the kind of narrative. They are fully supporting Zelensky, even when he has lost credibility—not only in America, but certainly in the Global South—because of his rhetoric, his changeability, his unpredictability, and his determination to push Europe and the United States into a much wider conflict with Russia, to the point of even risking a third world war. He has not changed that position at all. In fact, his rhetoric is becoming more and more unhindered.

And more than that, if you have at the head of Europe in the European Union people like Von der Leyen, Kaja Kallas, or that defense chief from Lithuania—these are diehard, diehard anti-Russian personalities.

How can you think about Europe taking initiatives for peace if these are the people in charge of the European Union in Brussels? Then you have the Danish Prime Minister, already threatened by Trump's America over Greenland, saying that war in Ukraine is safer than peace in Ukraine. Because they feel that if the United States manages to promote some kind of solution and Europe is left out, Europe will be finished geopolitically.

Now, from an external perspective, they want to increase their defense budgets and military capacities — all this while their economies are struggling, with many countries heavily indebted. But even if you want to build up military capacity, it can’t happen overnight. It’ll take years to establish a production base and raise armed forces to credible levels.

And what happens if tomorrow, or the day after, there is some kind of resolution to the Ukraine conflict? Then the entire premise behind this militarization of Europe — which assumes a permanent hostility with Russia — is undermined. This is already evident in the fact that the UK signed a 100-year security agreement with Ukraine. That implies they don’t foresee normal, friendly ties with Russia for the next century.

If peace gains traction, how will they justify this rise in defense spending, especially when it impacts social spending? There are already social tensions on the ground.

What’s more disturbing is the betrayal of Europe’s own values. Europe once prided itself on representing values on which global governance should be anchored — spreading those values globally. But now they’ve taken steps totally opposed to those values. There’s censorship. Russian media isn’t allowed to be broadcast in Europe.

Why is Europe afraid? Even if there’s propaganda from the Russian side, shouldn't they have confidence in their public’s maturity to distinguish facts from propaganda? It’s supposed to be about free speech, about allowing dissent and opposing views. In France, for example, far-left or far-right positions that don’t align with Macron’s are tolerated — and that diversity shapes the political system.

There is lawfare happening across the continent. Take Romania — they banned the leading candidate, the likely winner of the election. He’s not even allowed to run. In Georgia, they’re doing everything they can to destabilize the ruling party. The President of Georgia, who is of French origin, played a role that, at least from the outside, doesn’t seem to follow the best constitutional practices. Something similar is going on in Moldova.

In Serbia, there’s a clear effort to create a regime change scenario — like a Maidan-style uprising. In Slovakia, there was an attempt on the life of Prime Minister Fico, who holds very sober views on de-escalation and peace in Europe. And then there’s Viktor Orbán, who has consistently advocated for dialogue and diplomacy with Russia. He is constantly attacked.

In a recent vote on aid to Ukraine, Orbán voted against it — and the principle of consensus was completely ignored. His vote was simply discarded as meaningless.

Europe has taken other questionable actions too — like confiscating Russia’s foreign exchange reserves. They claim they won’t touch the principal, but they’re using the interest earned from those reserves to finance weapons and Ukraine’s reconstruction. To outsiders, this doesn’t make sense. If the principal can’t be confiscated, how can the interest be taken? It simply doesn’t add up.

L’Eclaireur: I don’t know if you saw what happened to Marine Le Pen today.

They’re doing it another way now — lawfare. There’s a lot of it going on.

But when we talk about Europe — what do we actually mean? Are we talking about the EU? And by EU, do we mean the European institutions like the Commission? Because von der Leyen essentially is the Commission.

Let me be a bit provocative — would anything be different if there were no supranational EU? Isn’t the EU basically just a subsidiary of NATO ?

Kanwal Sibal: Well, you know, of course, I’m not speaking as an analyst. But at the official level, India’s policy and approach is somewhat different. We see significant value in maintaining strong ties with Europe, and we are actively trying to expand those ties. A few weeks ago, Ursula von der Leyen came to India with 22 of the 27 EU commissioners to deepen trade relations and broaden our overall relationship with Europe. We're also negotiating a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the EU.

We believe Europe has an important role to play in international politics and in maintaining a global balance of power. If Europe is weakened beyond a certain point, it would be a loss to the international community. After all, with a population of around 450–460 million, Europe represents a massive consumption market due to its high standards of living. It’s also a key source of advanced technology—even though it's spread across various countries rather than centralized.

Europe also has considerable military strength. Individual countries like France and the UK have nuclear capabilities and produce high-quality defense products—Airbus, BAE, and so on. Furthermore, in global negotiations—be it on climate change, SDG goals, or UN reform—Europe’s cooperation is indispensable.

However, Europe seems to be becoming its own worst enemy. It is losing ground in terms of reputation, especially in the Global South.

Now, coming to your question, there are two things. First, yes, there is a debate that bureaucrats in Brussels are taking on too much authority—perhaps even beyond their mandate. I’m not a scholar of the EU constitution, but it appears that some decisions, like spending on defense and allocating defense budgets, are being made at the EU level, which may not fall within their legal remit.

L’Eclaireur : All defense matters are definitely not EU competencies. Exactly. That’s why the idea of an EU Commissioner for Defense is odd—the position doesn’t even exist.

These people have lost all contact with reality. They’re not even focused on defeating Russia anymore. It seems more like they’re just clinging to power and trying to prevent European institutions from crumbling, because they’re becoming increasingly unpopular with the public.

Kanwal Sibal : Yes, that’s why I said the EU is arrogating too much power to itself. Unfortunately, even sovereign European countries are now adopting positions that don’t help their reputations. Take Germany, for example. From Chancellor Scholz to the current leadership, the rhetoric and postures have been surprisingly aggressive. I had assumed, given Germany’s history, they would be cautious about their weapons being used to kill Russians again. But now, the new chancellor is even threatening more confrontation.

As for France, I’ve always respected its foreign policy, but President Macron’s hardline stance is surprising. He, along with leaders like Starmer, seems to be leading the charge against Russia, pushing for European armed forces to coordinate potential operations. When they talk about sending peacekeeping forces, they know full well Russia has categorically rejected the idea of NATO forces—so-called peacekeepers—being sent to Ukraine. Russia’s UN ambassador said it just days ago, yet Europe persists, with Macron even stating they’re operationalizing that decision. Meetings between defense chiefs are already taking place to plan this out.

This kind of initiative—especially from France, Germany, and the UK—leaves me puzzled. What exactly are they hoping to achieve? When the U.S. and Europe were united under the Biden administration to strategically defeat Russia, they didn’t succeed. How does Europe now think it can accomplish this without the U.S.? It’s simply not possible.

The other issue is that figures like Ursula von der Leyen and Kaja Kallas didn’t get into power on their own—they were backed by major European countries. Leaders from small Baltic states like Estonia have been given disproportionate influence in Brussels. These countries have small populations, limited global exposure, and no tradition in international affairs or geopolitical nuance. Their fears of Russia may be understandable, given historical experiences during the Soviet era, but such fears—or phobias—should not be the foundation of Europe’s foreign policy.

Even countries like Poland cannot be expected to maintain a balanced, long-term approach to Russia due to their own historical baggage. So it's perplexing to outsiders why Europe is going down this road. When Trump was in office and appeared willing to engage with Russia to find a resolution to the Ukraine conflict, I thought Europe would take the opportunity to cut its losses and join the initiative diplomatically. It would’ve been a convenient political cover.

Instead, Europe is now talking about separating from the United States and going it alone—building independent defense capabilities at a time when their economies are struggling. On top of that, we might even see trade conflicts, tariff wars between Europe and the U.S., which will harm both sides.

And where Trump has made it very, very clear that Ukraine is not going to join NATO, and they are not going to get involved in any conflict with Russia over Ukraine. I thought that this was a good enough signal for them to actually tone down the rhetoric and try and shape a different narrative which would be supportive of the general idea of finding some solution to the conflict, rather than this posturing of going it alone, which nobody thinks is credible.

L'Eclaireur : Well, there may be another explanation for that. The European Union is trying to increase its competencies through crisis and through what we call competency creep, which is usually what bureaucracies which are not kept at bay do. And that's also one of the explanations which are set forth. Is India still an unaligned country?

Kanwal Sibal : Yes, we are, in the sense that we have maintained our ties with Russia, even though we were put under great pressure by the Biden administration and by Europe. In fact, when von der Leyen came here about three years ago, she lectured us on how we were on the wrong side of history and how it was morally imperative for India to side with Ukraine and condemn Russian aggression. They were very unhappy that we were abstaining in the UN Security Council and UNGA votes and that we were buying oil from Russia. But this time when she came, the narrative was totally different.

L'Eclaireur : But she might have figured out that the oil that you bought from Russia was refined in India and sold back to us as much needed fuel.

Kanwal Sibal : Yes, that is there. But apart from that, now I find that even a paper like The Economist, which is traditionally very biased and critical of India, has actually in a recent article praised India's policy — that India has been able to maintain ties with both sides and has been very successful in its diplomacy, and that others needed to emulate that. But leave that aside. At the same time, we maintained very good ties with the Biden administration. And over time, they ceased talking to us about pressures to reduce ties with Russia.

Even on the oil trade, I can share with you something which you may already know — that the outgoing U.S. ambassador to India, at a public function here, said that the U.S. had advised India to continue to buy Russian oil because that would keep the prices down internationally and help the U.S. consumer. And so there are wheels within wheels. I don't think this was the case at all. We took an independent decision. But leave this aside. During the four years of the Biden administration, our relations with the U.S. government expanded a great deal.

So we had good relations with the United States, good relations with Russia, good relations with Europe, and we've kept our doors open to China. China is now maybe the second largest trading partner in goods — $130 billion of trade — even as our forces are confronting each other on the border. And we've kept that door open because it increases our options. If we were to burn our boats with China, then we'll become much more vulnerable in terms of pressures from other quarters.

But at the same time, we are also participating in efforts to deter China — either through the Quad or the Indo-Pacific or our very strong relations with Japan and with the Philippines. In fact, we have given some very advanced missiles to the Philippines. So I think so far we have managed to play this balancing game where, in pursuit of our stated foreign policy objective of being friendly with all countries, we have been reasonably successful.

L'Eclaireur : Including with Pakistan, by the way, which is...?

Kanwal Sibal: Not with Pakistan.

L'Eclaireur: Not with Pakistan, okay (laughters).

Kanwal Sibal : No, no, no. With Pakistan, it's different. Pakistan is sort of half imploding. As you know, they are in huge difficulty internally. It is a total mess. Their politics is a total mess. But what has made that mess even messier is the whole strategic objective of propelling the Taliban into power in Afghanistan. So in that situation, Pakistan is not at the moment a problem.

Even the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Gwadar have had great difficulty because of the Balochistan Liberation Front — which is attacking Chinese workers, sometimes with Pakistani soldiers. So even that project has stalled, which was a headache for us. So in that sense, Pakistan has been ignored by us. Otherwise, the situation on the border is relatively quiet — in the sense that Pakistan is so embroiled in its own difficulties that it has little time to promote terrorism in India, though here and there they continue to do mischief.

L'Eclaireur : What about India and Africa, which has strong ties that have been developed over the past 30 years or so?

Kanwal Sibal : No, actually longer than that. Right from the start, after we became independent, we broke our relations with South Africa because of apartheid. We supported Nelson Mandela and politically supported the liberation movements of Africa. I myself served in Tanzania and met at that time Mugabe, Sam Nujoma, and others. But we were giving them political support in the Non-Aligned Movement and in the United Nations.

We have had strong Indian communities in East Africa, particularly in Kenya and Tanzania. So they have been the instrument for our activity there on all fronts. We've had very strong traditional ties with Ethiopia. In fact, we set up the first military academy in Sudan. With Ethiopia, we've had outstanding ties and helped them in many ways.

Now in West Africa, our companies have been very active. Our telecom companies, in particular, have been active, as well as our IT companies. We have some very well-funded training programs for African bureaucrats, and many of them have been trained in India over the years.

Now I find that even a paper like The Economist, which is traditionally very biased and critical of India, has actually praised India's policy — that India has been able to maintain ties with both sides and has been very successful in its diplomacy and that others needed to emulate that.

At the same time, we maintained very good ties with the Biden administration. Over time, they ceased talking to us about pressures to reduce ties with Russia. Even on the oil trade, the outgoing U.S. ambassador to India said at a public function that the U.S. had advised India to continue to buy Russian oil because that would help keep prices down internationally and benefit the U.S. consumer. So there are wheels within wheels. I don't think this was the case at all — we took an independent decision.

During the four years of the Biden administration, our relations with the U.S. government expanded a great deal. So we had good relations with the United States, good relations with Russia, good relations with Europe, and we've kept our doors open to China. China is now maybe the second-largest trading partner in goods — $130 billion of trade — even as our forces are confronting each other on the border. We've kept that door open because it increases our options. If we were to burn our boats with China, we’d become much more vulnerable to pressures from other quarters.

At the same time, we are also participating in efforts to deter China, either through the Quad or the Indo-Pacific or our very strong relations with Japan and the Philippines. In fact, we have given some very advanced missiles to the Philippines. So far, we have managed to play this balancing game where, in pursuit of our stated foreign policy objective of being friendly with all countries, we have been reasonably successful.

With Pakistan, it's different. Pakistan is sort of half imploding. They are in huge difficulty internally — it’s a total mess, especially politically. What has made that mess even messier is the strategic objective of propelling the Taliban into power in Afghanistan. So in that situation, Pakistan is not at the moment a problem. Even the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Gwadar have had great difficulty because of the Balochistan Liberation Front, with Pakistani soldiers attacking Chinese workers. That project has stalled, which was a headache for us. In that sense, Pakistan has been ignored by us.

The situation on the border is relatively quiet because Pakistan is so embroiled in its own difficulties, it has little time to promote terrorism in India — though here and there, they continue to do mischief.

As for Africa, our ties are long-standing. After we became independent, we broke our relations with South Africa because of apartheid. We supported Nelson Mandela and the liberation movements of Africa politically. I served in Tanzania and met leaders like Mugabe and Sam Nujoma. We supported them politically in the Non-Aligned Movement and the United Nations. We also have strong Indian communities in East Africa, especially Kenya and Tanzania. They have been instrumental in our activities on all fronts.

We have had very strong traditional ties with Ethiopia. We helped them in many ways. We even set up the first military academy in Sudan. Now in West Africa, our companies have been very active — especially our telecom and IT companies. We also run well-funded training programs for African bureaucrats; many have been trained in India over the years.

However, China has penetrated Africa so much that they have outdistanced us. If you compare China's activities in Africa with ours, there is clearly an imbalance — even though we preceded China in our cooperation with Africa by many years. But our approach is different. We do projects that Africans genuinely want. We assess their needs and provide accordingly, rather than using platforms like the BRI to offload excess capacities, as China does in infrastructure and other areas.

India’s approach is more human-centric, with greater willingness to transfer technology. We’re very active in the health sector — 40% of the generic drugs that America buys are from India. Indian generics are also very popular in Africa.

On the question of a multipolar world: I was involved in the RIC — the Russia-India-China dialogue — when I was Foreign Secretary. That initiative came from Mr. Primakov during the unilateralist phase of U.S. foreign policy, particularly around Iraq. The idea was that if Russia, India, and China came together, it could act as a bulwark against U.S. unilateralism. That didn’t quite go as planned because India-China relations remain difficult and we don't trust the Chinese. Still, the platform existed.

Then BRICS expanded to include Brazil to give it a more continental spread, and later China brought South Africa into the fold — not because it fit the metrics of an emerging economy, but for political reasons. Now you have five more countries joining BRICS, largely from the Middle East — Iran, Egypt, Indonesia, Ethiopia, etc. Many others have become associate members.

All these countries are hedging their bets. They don't want to be dominated by the West. They seek ties with non-Western countries to increase their room for maneuver on the global stage.

On the G20: it's a forum where G7 countries and major emerging economies work together. India has been extremely active and successful in shifting the G20 agenda away from G7 priorities toward the concerns of the Global South. In a sense, this is a contribution to multipolarity — recognizing that global issues can’t be dealt with solely from the perspective of developed countries.

China has penetrated Africa so much that they have outdistanced us. If you compare China's activities in Africa and ours, then there is clearly some sort of imbalance where we've not been able to do as much, despite the fact that we preceded China in our cooperation with Africa by many years.

But our entire approach to Africa is very different. We genuinely do projects which the Africans want. We see what their needs are and give them what they want, rather than using, like China does, the BRI for finding markets for their excess capacities in infrastructure building and other areas. The Chinese are very good at that, but they do it in a different way—finding markets for themselves to create outlets for excess capacity.

India is not pursuing that policy. It is a much more human-centric approach with greater willingness to transfer technology. On the health sector, we are very active because we have strengthened that area. You know, 40% of the generic drugs that America buys are from India. And generic Indian drugs in Africa are needed and very popular. That’s another area in which we are strong.

Well, you know, I was associated, when I was in service as the foreign secretary, with the RIC—the Russia-India-China Dialogue. The inspiration for that came from Mr. Primakov, the Prime Minister of Russia. That was during the unilateralist phase of US foreign policy—like in Iraq and other cases. The idea was that if Russia, India, and China got together, it could be a bulwark against US unilateralism.

That didn’t work as planned because India-China relations continue to be difficult, and we don't trust the Chinese. Nevertheless, the platform existed. It was later enlarged into BRIC with the inclusion of Brazil, to give it a more continental spread. China then brought South Africa into BRICS because their biggest partner in Africa was South Africa, even though it didn’t measure up to the economic metrics of emerging economies. But it was included for political reasons.

Now, you have an additional five countries joining BRICS, largely from the Middle East—like Iran, Egypt, and also Indonesia and Ethiopia. Many other countries have become associate members. All these countries are hedging their bets. They don’t want to be dominated by the West. They want to establish ties with non-Western countries to gain more room on the international stage.

Then you have the G20, where the G7 countries and major emerging economies from non-Western countries work together. India has been extremely active and has succeeded in shifting the G20 agenda from that of the G7 to the agenda of the Global South. This contributes to multipolarity by recognizing that global issues cannot be handled solely from the perspective of developed countries. The focus should now be on the concerns and priorities of developing countries.

This is the broader agenda of BRICS and the multipolar world. It’s a good and realistic objective, given the current distribution of power and the decline of Western hegemony. However, to imagine a truly multipolar world is a bit of a stretch.

Russia, formerly the Soviet Union, was considered a pole. After the Soviet collapse, Russia's power declined, but it still considers itself a pole—and justifiably so. Countries in Central Asia, Africa, and others look up to Russia. It’s a permanent member of the UN Security Council, so it has influence.

China is a pole due to two reasons—its permanent membership of the Security Council and its economic policies through the BRI. It’s the largest manufacturing power and the biggest exporter in the world.

India is not a permanent member of the Security Council. We have a difficult periphery and are not fully able to control it. Still, we are a voice of the Global South, which gives us prestige. But we’re not yet a pole in the sense that others will follow our lead, though on specific issues, some countries may align with us because we articulate their interests well.

We are a growing economy—already the fifth largest—and by 2030, or earlier, we’ll overtake Germany to become the third largest. That increases our international value, politically and economically. So, vaguely speaking, India will become some sort of a “half-pole,” where we’re courted by the West, the Global South, Russia, and China—who all see India as a valuable market, though we keep them out to some extent.

Japan was once touted as a pole, but I don’t see it becoming one. Japan’s security is completely dependent on the United States, unlike India, which isn’t under any security umbrella. That gives us independent prestige.

For Russia and China, a multipolar world is essentially anti-West—against Western domination and hegemony. The US treats Russia and China as adversaries, and the EU treats Russia as an enemy and China as a systemic rival. India, however, has excellent relations with the US, Europe, and Russia.

So for us, a multipolar world is not anti-Western. It’s about recognizing our legitimate aspiration to play a greater role in global governance. We need more space at the global level, which requires a dilution of old or new hegemonies.

That’s why we’ve said—repeatedly—that before we talk about a multipolar world, we must first have a multipolar Asia. And the meaning of this is clear.

La cascade de 2017, l’affaire Fillon, qui permit à Emmanuel Macron de passer le second tour grâce à ce qui fût un coup d’état judiciaire, n’est pas reproductible. La magistrature ne semble pas prête à prendre ce risque.

L’annulation de l’élection au motif - allez, au hasard, d’ingérence russe - est une impossibilité parce que personne n’y croira. Le Russiagate est passé par là, et on sait que les ingérences ne sont pas russe, mais américaines, allemandes et israéliennes. Pour annuler une élection, il faut démontrer que la “manipulation de l’information” a faussé la sincérité du scrutin. L’existence d’une “manipulation de l’information” en elle-même n’est pas suffisante.

La manœuvre qui a consisté à tenter de mettre aux postes clé de la République des séides d’Emmanuel Macron afin de s’assurer que, quel soit l’élu, il échoue, a capoté avec la nomination de Marc Guillaume à la vice-présidence du Conseil d’Etat.

Les gesticulations européennes - DSA, bouclier démocratique et la dernière fulgurance de Nathalie Loiseau, à savoir donner compétence à Europol pour identifier les manipulations de l’information, resteront inopérants car tout ce qui concerne les élections n’est régi que par le code électoral français et ne relève que du juge de l’élection.

Bref, cul-de-sac, impasse et damnation.

Scheduled for rollout by the European Commission before the end of 2026, the European Digital Identity Wallet — the EUDI Wallet — is billed as a major step toward the Old Continent’s digital sovereignty. The reality Jaap-Henk Hoepman describes is something else entirely: a rushed project, riddled with cryptographic gaps, whose current architecture fails to meet several requirements of the eIDAS 2.0 regulation, particularly on privacy.

A regulation that betrays itself

The original problem is structural: for the first time, a European regulation defined a technical artifact in legal language. The translation between these two laguages — law and engineering — broke down. Largely because the bureaucrats who drafted the regulation and are overseeing its implementation have little grasp of the technology.

The wallet’s technical specifications were developed in near-total isolation, with insufficient consultation of the academic community and NGOs. The European Parliament itself had little say over the architectural choices.

The crux of the problem is user traceability. In the initial version of the project, every identification left a cryptographic fingerprint unique to each user — a stable identifier that, by cross-referencing data from different verifiers, could reconstruct an individual’s digital activities. A mass surveillance mechanism by design, in direct violation of eIDAS 2.0 and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

The zero-knowledge proof battle

Faced with repeated warnings from the cryptographic community — including Jaap-Henk Hoepman and Olivier Blazy, whom we interviewed previously — the Commission attempted a workaround: rather than a single identifier, issue each user a booklet of single-use identifiers, replenishable on demand. The idea: present a different coupon each time to muddy the trail. Insufficient, says Hoepman. The issuer of those identifiers — the state — holds the full set, which preserves the possibility of centralized, sweeping surveillance.

A robust, battle-tested solution does exist: BBS+ signatures, grounded in zero-knowledge proofs. They allow a user to prove they possess an attribute — “I am over 18” — without ever revealing the underlying information (their date of birth), any identifier, or any traceable cryptographic footprint.

But this signature protocol has yet to make it onto the list of approved cryptographic standards. Institutions are conservative by nature: they only use what has been officially certified. Orange, a European company, developed a working BBS+ prototype for the EUDI — the European Commission did not bother to examine it.

Digital sovereignty, sacrificed to Google and Apple

The irony is brutal. One of the driving ambitions behind the EUDI project was precisely to prevent American tech giants — Apple and Google, which already issue digital driving licenses in the United States — from capturing Europe’s identity market.

Yet the current architecture requires, in countries such as Germany and the Netherlands, that the EUDI application be installed exclusively via the Google Play Store or Apple Store and run only on official Android or iOS devices. Using it on an alternative smartphone running GrapheneOS, CalyxOS, or /e/OS — the open Android variants designed specifically to protect privacy — is simply not possible. The dependency on hardware certification imposed by Google and Apple entrenches exactly the vassalage the project claimed to dismantle.

The quantum gap

The EUDI Wallet incorporates no post-quantum security, even as the U.S. NIST published its first quantum-resistant algorithms in 2024 and most global actors have begun their migration. Hoepman tempers the immediate alarm somewhat: for signatures (as opposed to encryption), keys are renewed every five to ten years — before a sufficiently powerful quantum computer could compromise them. Migration toward post-quantum security remains feasible, but it requires a political will to plan ahead that is currently nowhere in sight.

The silent risk: function creep

Even in the optimistic scenario of a fully secure, privacy-compliant system in line with eIDAS 2.0, what Hoepman calls function creep remains. An identity infrastructure as vast and encompassing as the EUDI Wallet will naturally become the mandatory gateway for everything and anything.

Age verification for digital platforms, already moving through the legislative pipeline, is only the first example. Marital status, financial standing, and any attribute that can technically be attested will follow. The wallet will centralize documents whose dispersal has, until now, served as a safeguard against abuse.

More subtly, the widespread adoption of officially certified proofs will put an end to the small liberties people currently take with the truth to protect their privacy. Today, one invents a false date of birth or a fake phone number to sign up for a service that has no genuine need for it. Tomorrow, that same service will be able to demand a certified proof — and all accredited services will be able to demand what they want, not merely what they need.

Inevitable deployment, adoption by default

On the question of EUDI adoption, Hoepman offers no illusions. The European wallet will replace existing national digital identity systems — DigiD in the Netherlands, for instance, used for tax administration. Usage will be effectively compulsory, much as holding a bank account is today: theoretically optional, practically unavoidable. Tech-savvy holdouts will always be able to turn to VPNs or alternative systems — but they will remain a vanishingly small minority.

The computer science professor does not advocate scrapping the project. He argues for a measured slowdown; for the mandatory — not optional — adoption of zero-knowledge proofs; for genuine independence from Big Tech’s proprietary ecosystems; and for a strict registry of the data each verifier is authorized to request. Safeguards that could have been built in from the start — and whose absence transforms a supposed sovereignty tool into a potential instrument of control.

Time is running out. Deployment is announced for end of 2026. And as Jaap-Henk Hoepman notes soberly in closing: “There is no contingency plan. But it’s the same with digital payments.” A normalization of systemic risk that, in matters of digital identity, sovereignty, and security, ought at the very least to warrant a democratic debate worthy of the name.

Ce podcast est en anglais. Vous retrouverez ci-dessous la version condensée en français sous forme d’article.

Prévu pour une distribution par la Commission européenne d'ici fin 2026, le portefeuille d'identité numérique européen — l'EUDI Wallet — est présenté comme une avancée majeure vers la souveraineté numérique du Vieux continent. La réalité que décrit Jaap-Henk Hoepman est tout autre : un projet précipité, lacunaire sur le plan cryptographique, et dont l'architecture actuelle n’est pas conforme à certaines des exigences du règlement eIDAS 2.0, notamment en matière de protection de la vie privée.

Une réglementation qui se trahit elle-même

Le problème originel est structurel : pour la première fois, un règlement européen a défini en langage juridique un artefact technique. La traduction entre ces deux idiomes — celui du droit et celui de l’ingénierie — s’est révélée défaillante. Principalement parce que les bureaucrates qui ont rédigé le règlement et qui sont en charge de sa mise en oeuvre n’entendent rien à la technologie.

Les spécifications techniques du portefeuille électronique ont été développées quasi en vase clos, avec une consultation insuffisante de la communauté universitaire et des ONG. Le Parlement européen lui-même n’a eu que peu de prise sur les choix d’architecture.

Le nœud du problème porte sur la traçabilité des utilisateurs. Dans la version initiale du projet, chaque identification laissait la même empreinte cryptographique unique à chaque utilisateur — un identifiant stable qui permettait, en croisant les données des différents vérificateurs, de reconstituer les activités numériques d’un individu. Un mécanisme de surveillance de masse by design - à dessein - en violation directe du eIDAS 2.0 et de la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne.

La bataille des preuves à divulgation nulle

Face aux alertes répétées de la communauté cryptographique — dont Jaap-Henk Hoepman fait partie, mais également Olivier Blazy que nous avons interviewé — la Commission a tenté d’esquisser une parade : plutôt qu’un seul identifiant, délivrer à chaque utilisateur un carnet d’identifiants à usage unique, rechargeable. L’idée : présenter chaque fois un identifiant différent pour brouiller les pistes. Insuffisant, juge Hoepman : l’émetteur de ces identifiants, l’Etat, en connaît la totalité, ce qui maintient la possibilité de surveillance centralisée et généralisée.

Une solution robuste et éprouvée existe pourtant : les signatures BBS+, fondées sur les preuves à divulgation nulle de connaissance (zero-knowledge proofs1). Elles permettent de prouver qu’on possède un attribut — « j’ai plus de 18 ans » — sans jamais révéler l’information elle-même (sa date de naissance) ni aucun identifiant ni empreinte cryptographique traçable, y compris dans les métadonnées.

Mais le BBS+ ne figure pas encore sur la liste des standards cryptographiques approuvés. Les institutions sont conservatrices par nature : elles n’utilisent que ce qui est officiellement homologué. Orange, entreprise européenne, a par exemple développé un prototype de mise en œuvre BBS+ pour l’EUDI — la Commission européenne n’a pas daigné l’examiner.

La souveraineté numérique, sacrifiée à Google et Apple

L’ironie est cruelle : l’un des moteurs du projet EUDI était précisément d’éviter que des géants privés américains — Apple et Google, qui émettent déjà des permis de conduire numériques aux États-Unis — ne s’emparent du marché de l’identité en Europe.

Or l’architecture actuelle impose, dans des pays comme l’Allemagne et les Pays-Bas, que l’application du EUDI soit installée exclusivement via le Google Play Store et le Apple Store, et ne fonctionne que sur des terminaux Android ou iOS officiels. Impossible, donc, de l’utiliser sur un smartphone alternatif tournant sous GrapheneOS, CalyxOS ou /e/OS — ces versions ouvertes d’Android qui préservent précisément la vie privée. La dépendance à la certification matérielle imposée par Google et Apple renforce la vassalité que le projet prétendait abolir.

La faille quantique

EUDI Wallet n'intègre pas de sécurité post-quantique, alors que le NIST américain a publié les premiers algorithmes résistants aux attaques par des ordinateurs quantiques dès 2024, et que la majorité des acteurs ont entamé leur migration. Hoepman relativise néanmoins l'urgence immédiate : pour les signatures (par opposition au chiffrement), les clés sont renouvelées tous les cinq à dix ans — avant qu'un ordinateur quantique suffisamment puissant ne puisse les compromettre. La migration vers une sécurité post-quantique reste possible, mais elle suppose une volonté politique d'anticipation qui fait aujourd'hui défaut.

Le risque silencieux : la dérive des usages

Même dans l’hypothèse optimiste d’un système entièrement sécurisé et respectueux de la vie privée conforme au règlement eIDAS 2.0 , subsiste ce que Hoepman nomme le function creep — la dérive fonctionnelle. Une infrastructure d’identité aussi large et englobante que l’EUDI Wallet deviendra naturellement le passage obligé pour tout et n’importe quoi.

La vérification d’âge pour les plateformes numériques, déjà dans les tuyaux législatifs, n’en est que le premier exemple. Viendront ensuite la situation familiale, la situation financière, et tout attribut qu’il est techniquement possible d’attester. Le portefeuille centralisera des documents dont la dispersion constituait jusqu’ici une protection contre les abus.

Plus subtilement, la généralisation de ces preuves officiellement certifiées mettra fin aux petits arrangements que chacun pratique avec la vérité afin de protéger sa vie privée. Aujourd’hui, on invente une fausse date de naissance, un faux numéro de téléphone pour s’inscrire à un service qui n’a pas besoin de ces informations. Demain, ce même service pourra exiger une preuve certifiée, et tous les services agréés pourront exiger ce qu’il veulent, pas seulement ce dont ils ont besoin.

Un déploiement inévitable, une adoption par défaut

À la question de l’adoption du EUDI, Hoepman ne laisse guère d’illusions. Le portefeuille européen remplacera les systèmes d’identité numérique nationaux déjà en place — DigiD aux Pays-Bas, par exemple, utilisé pour les démarches fiscales, ou France Identité chez nous. L’usage sera de fait contraint, comme l’est aujourd’hui la possession d’un compte bancaire : théoriquement facultatif, pratiquement incontournable. Les résistants technophiles pourront toujours se tourner vers les VPN durs ou les systèmes alternatifs — mais ils resteront une minorité.

Jaap-Henk Hoepman ne prône pas l’abandon du projet. Il plaide pour son ralentissement raisonné, pour l’adoption obligatoire — et non optionnelle — des preuves zero-knowledge, pour une indépendance réelle vis-à-vis des écosystèmes propriétaires des Gafam, et pour un registre strict des données que chaque vérificateur est autorisé à demander. Ces garde-fous auraient dus être intégrés dès le départ. Et dont l’absence transforme un prétendu outil de souveraineté en instrument potentiel de contrôle.

L’heure tourne. Le déploiement est annoncé pour fin 2026. Et comme le note sobrement Jaap-Henk Hoepman : « Il n’y a aucun plan de contingence. Mais c’est la même chose avec les paiements numériques. » Une normalisation du risque systémique qui, en matière d’identité numérique, de souveraineté et de sécurité, devrait au moins mériter un débat démocratique digne de ce nom.

En France, souffrirait-on toujours du syndrome aiguë de la ligne Maginot? Avons-nous une fois de plus une guerre de retard?

Le Scaf, une idée originellement de Dassault, était déjà obsolète au moment de sa conception sur le papier. Pourquoi persevérer dans l’erreur?

Le second porte-avion français? Une chimère à 15 milliards d’euros, une baignoire flottante qui relève plus de la mentalité impérialiste et néocoloniale de notre classe politique et de nos états-majors que d’une volonté d’efficacité militaire: un porte-avions ne vaut que contre des adversaires faibles ne disposant pas de défense anti-aérienne moderne ni des moyens de le couler.

Les drones? Nous avons complètement raté le coche parce qu’on a refusé de comprendre que le vecteur importe plus que la charge utile, qui ne vaut rien sans vecteur la délivrant. Logique nous direz-vous, mais la logique ne semble pas présider aux choix industriels. Même chose pour nos capacités en matière de missiles.

Et surtout, une absence de pensée stratégique, à commencer par la compréhension de qui sont nos ennemis, au sens de ceux qui pourrait s’en prendre à notre territoire national. On peine à sérier quel Etat ambitionnerait de s’attaquer à nous, alors que la France est dans l’incapacité de contrôler son domaine maritime, le deuxième plus vaste au monde.

Et puis il y a un secteur complément passé sous silence, celui des ballons dirigeables. Non, ce n’est pas du “Steam Punk”, c’est extrêmement sérieux vu leur charge utile, comprendre le poids qu’ils sont capables de transporter, très supérieur à ceux des avions gros porteurs, pour un coup moindre et une autonomie inégalée .

Jean-François Geneste est diplômé de l’École Nationale Supérieure d'Ingénieurs de Constructions Aéronautiques (ENSICA, aujourd'hui ISAE-SUPAERO). Il a effectué toute sa carrière dans l’aérospatiale, chez Matra puis chez EADS/Airbus. Il dirige aujourd’hui une start-up conçue comme une plateforme de recherche, la WARPA (World Advanced Research Project Agency), manière de clin d’oeil malicieux à la Darpa américaine.

Should we read this as yet another brick in the wall of mass surveillance that dares not speak its name, at a time when countries across the globe are rolling out comparable systems? And yet, as Olivier Blazy points out, the technical solution could hardly be simpler: “all you need to do is ask the internet service provider for the connection data.”

Shoddy work. Improvisation. Nothing holds up in this app, built to Brussels’ specifications. For the cybersecurity specialist and professor at the École Polytechnique in Paris, the choice of this technical approach — one that countries like France and Germany are viewing with considerable scepticism, with France actively developing its own sovereign alternative — is deeply questionable.

“Digital identity, done properly, can be genuinely useful to people — but not this,” Olivier Blazy states bluntly. “This age-verification application, as conceived, makes no sense whatsoever.”

Below is the podcast’s summary in English.

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Faut-il y voir une brique de plus dans une surveillance de masse qui ne dit pas son nom, de nombreux pays de par le monde déployant des systèmes analogues ? Il y a pourtant plus simple pour contrôler, nous dit Olivier Blazy : “il suffit de demander au fournisseur d’accès les informations de connexion”.

Bricolage ? Improvisation ? Rien ne va dans cette appli conçue à la demande de Bruxelles”. Pour le spécialiste en cybersécurité et professeur à l’école Polytechnique à Paris, le choix de cette solution technique, sur laquelle des pays comme la France ou l’Allemagne sont particulièrement réservés - la France travaille à une application souveraine - est éminemment discutable.

“L’identité numérique bien faite pourra vraiment être utile aux gens, mais pas ça !” souligne Olivier Blazy. “Cette application de vérification par l’âge telle qu’elle a été conçue n’a aucun sens”.

A lire également :

Scott Horton est un intellectuel, un homme de radio et un auteur réputé pour sa critique particulièrement charpentée de la politique étrangère américaine. Il est également le directeur du Libertarian Institute et anime la Scott Horton Academy, un centre de ressources éducatives sur les relations internationales.

Nous vous conseillons deux de ses ouvrages, malheureusement pas (encore) disponibles en français:

Enough Already: Time to End the War on Terrorism (Ça suffit: il est temps de mettre un terme la guerre contre le terrorisme). Libertarian Institute, 2021.

Provoked: How Washington Started the New Cold War With Russia and the Catastrophe in Ukraine (Provocation: comment Washington est responsable de la nouvelle guerre froide contre la Russie et de la catastrophe ukrainienne). Libertarian Institute, 2024.

Vous pouvez retrouver Scott Horton dans deux podcasts:

• The Scott Horton Show

• Provoked, avec Darryl Cooper

Nous nous excusons pour les petits problèmes de son, indépendants de notre volonté.

Ci-après, un condensé en français de ce long entretien.

La guerre contre l’Iran : un piège annoncé

“Le discours de Trump le 1er avril offrait au moins une maigre consolation : pas d’annonce d’une escalade terrestre massive, ce scénario hollywoodien absurde où l’on parachuterait Delta Force et Navy SEALs au cœur d’Ispahan pour y rafler les stocks d’hexafluorure d’uranium, construire une piste d’atterrissage improvisée en plein désert et déterrer des ogives à la foreuse — le tout à portée d’une métropole de plusieurs millions d’habitants, dans un pays de cent millions d’âmes grand comme deux fois et demi le Texas.”

“Le Pentagone a mis d’ailleurs Trump en garde. Deux jours avant le déclenchement des hostilités, le chef d’état-major interarmées alertait dans les colonnes du Wall Street Journal : l’Iran possède plus de missiles offensifs que les États-Unis n’ont de munitions pour leurs systèmes de défense. La suite n’a fait que confirmer ce sombre pronostic. Toutes les bases américaines du Golfe ont essuyé des frappes. Abu Dhabi et Dubaï ressemblent désormais à des villes fantômes. Les raffineries brûlent, les ports sont paralysés, et la Ve flotte américaine stationnée à Bahreïn est de fait hors de combat.”

Le piège des choix publics

“La mauvaise nouvelle, c’est que Trump se retrouve piégé dans ce que les libertariens appellent la théorie des choix publics. Principe élémentaire : les décisions collectives sont toujours prises par des individus mus par leurs propres intérêts. Un fonctionnaire n’oublie pas son ambition personelle en entrant en fonction ; un président ne dépose pas son ego au vestiaire avant sa prise de fonction.”

“Trump est devenu le Joe Biden de cette guerre : il l’a provoquée, il ne sait plus comment l’arrêter, et il doit désormais inventer une sortie qui sauve les apparences. C’est le syndrome Nixon revisité — « la paix dans l’honneur » au milieu du bourbier vietnamien. Sauf que Trump ne peut pas se permettre de dire simplement « on a échoué, on rentre ». Il lui faut une victoire, ou au minimum l’illusion d’une victoire. Sinon, il reste, s’enfonce, et double la mise.”

“Comme en Afghanistan pendant vingt ans. Comme en Ukraine, où l’on nous vendait la « deuxième armée du monde » — et où l’on a découvert, en effet, qu’elle était bien la deuxième… derrière l’armée Russe.”

Comment Trump a basculé

“La question centrale reste : qu’est-ce qui a fait passer Trump du discours du « président de la paix » à une guerre totale contre l’Iran ? La réponse tient en un mot : la flatterie. Israël a parfaitement joué le jeu. On peut parier sans grand risque qu’il existe, quelque part dans les services israéliens, un mémo intitulé “Comment manipuler Donald Trump en moins de trente minutes”. Conclusion : le flatter outrancièrement.”

“On lui a murmuré : oubliez George Washington, oubliez Abraham Lincoln. Si vous agissez, vous entrerez dans l’Histoire comme une figure biblique. Vous serez le Cyrus des temps modernes, le libérateur et sauveur du peuple juif. Franklin Roosevelt a laissé l’Holocauste advenir par inaction ; vous, vous pouvez l’empêcher. Votre nom résonnera à travers les millénaires. Et, accessoirement, vous êtes magnifique. Trump, flatté : « Vraiment ? Et tout ce que j’ai à faire, c’est déclencher cette guerre ? »”

“Ce n’est pas une caricature. Trump l’a lui-même admis lors d’un événement privé, filmé et diffusé : « Si on me flatte assez, je fais ce qu’on veut, même si ce sont de mauvaises choses. » Parole d’évangile. Lindsey Graham le sait. Netanyahu le sait. Jared Kushner, séide du Likoud et gendre omniprésent, n’a pas manqué de lui rappeler la grandeur de sa mission « civilisatrice ».”

L’illusion de puissance

“Ce conflit a mis à nu une vérité brutale : les bases américaines du Golfe n’étaient qu’un hologramme de puissance, une projection sans substance réelle. L’Iran a mis à jour ce bluff. De Erbil à Oman, chaque installation américaine a été touchée. Le Qatar a refusé l’usage de la base aérienne d’Al-Udeid pour des opérations offensives. Cette bases sont toujours là, intacte… et inutile, puisque les forces américaines ne peut les employer.”

“Résultat ? Certaines monarchies du Golfe entament déjà, par canaux discrets, des négociations directes avec Téhéran. Le message est limpide : « On pousse les Américains dehors du Golfe, on participe aux réparations que vous exigez — mais cessez les frappes. »”

“Voilà où en est le fameux « pivot stratégique » américain au Moyen-Orient.”

La seule issue honorable

“Que peut faire Trump pour sortir de ce bourbier ? Une seule chose : partir. Déclarer la victoire, faire décoller les avions, appareiller les navires vers l’ouest, et ne plus jamais en reparler.”

“Le problème, c’est que l’Iran ne lui facilitera pas la tâche. Téhéran a clairement indiqué que cette guerre se poursuivrait jusqu’à ce que l’Amérique comprenne qu’elle ne doit plus jamais s’attaquer à l’Iran. C’est le même message qu’en 1980, quand Jimmy Carter avait donné le feu vert à Saddam Hussein pour envahir l’Iran : le régime des mollahs, alors fragile, en est sorti renforcé, soudé par la menace extérieure, et a tenu ferme neuf ans de guerre. L’Iran avait repris tout son territoire dès 1982, puis a continué — non par nécessité, mais par choix.”

“En frappant le vieil ayatollah Khamenei— celui-là même qui invoquait la loi sacrée pour interdire les armes de destruction massive —, Trump a probablement porté au pouvoir des nationalistes plus radicaux encore, pour qui l’arme nucléaire n’est plus un tabou religieux mais une exigence stratégique. Ironie cruelle : il a fourni à l’Iran toutes les raisons de se doter de la bombe, tout en détruisant certaines installations, la freinant temporairement. On ne bombarde pas le savoir-faire. On ne bombarde pas les cerveaux des ingénieurs.”

L’accord de 2015 dénoncé

“L’accord de 2015 était imparfait, mais il fonctionnait : il avait réduit le programme nucléaire iranien, renforcé les inspections et, point décisif, introduit un mécanisme de vote à la majorité simple au Conseil de sécurité, permettant aux États-Unis de déclencher des contrôles surprise avec le seul appui de la France et du Royaume-Uni, sans possibilité de veto russe ou chinois.”

“La seule vraie critique de Trump ? L’Iran n’avait pas renoncé à sa capacité à fabriquer la bombe — c’est-à-dire la maîtrise du cycle du combustible. Or cette connaissance-là ne se détruit pas par des missiles. Elle réside dans les esprits. Elle voyage avec les experts.”

Pourquoi les libertariens sont anti-guerre

“Sur le plan idéologique, pourquoi les libertariens américains sont-ils si viscéralement opposés aux guerres d’empire ? La raison est arithmétique, pas sentimentale. Un appareil d’Etat de petite taille ne peut pas entretenir un empire. Les deux sont incompatibles : l’empire coûte cher, justifie l’impôt, gonfle l’État et corrompt les mécanismes du marché. Tout libertarien cohérent est donc anti-impérialiste par logique, non par pacifisme naïf.”

“Curieusement, cela les rapproche de Noam Chomsky sur un point : le désir d’une société minimisant la coercition. La différence tient à l’organisation : l’anarcho-syndicalisme de Chomsky suppose que des hiérarchies volontaires peuvent ignorer les lois économiques des prix — une fiction. La gauche a raison sur un diagnostic : le grand capital capture le grand État, et le grand État protège en retour le grand capital de la concurrence. Sa conclusion — renforcer l’État pour « corriger » cela — est absurde. La conclusion libertarienne est inverse : restreindre drastiquement le pouvoir de l’État de favoriser quiconque, car l’État ne sert jamais l’intérêt général. Il sert ceux qui ont les moyens de le capturer.”

“C’est pourquoi le progressisme américain n’est, en pratique, qu’une forme douce de fascisme corporatiste — ce que l’historien Robert Higgs nomme le « fascisme participatif » : des élections régulières, une économie prétendument mixte, mais une collusion permanente entre grandes entreprises et régulateurs, au détriment de tous les autres. L’« économie sociale de marché » européenne ? Même mécanisme, avec un nom plus élégant.”

L’erreur de faire…

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What remains is the conclusion. And the conclusion is this: a defeat for Israel and the United States of biblical proportions — one that was, from the very first shot, utterly inevitable.

A 20th-Century Military Fighting a 21st-Century War

Much has been made of “asymmetric warfare.” That framing, it turns out, is wrong. This was not asymmetric — the intensity on both sides was comparable. The difference was generational. The United States fought with aircraft carriers and air strikes, the arsenal of a fading imperial power. Iran fought with missiles and drones, the weapons of the age we actually live in. Different battlefield, different means, entirely predictable outcome.

The results speak for themselves. Iran rendered all 14 American bases in the Persian Gulf region inoperable. It destroyed US and Israeli long-range detection capabilities — including four THAAD radar systems worth $1.1 billion each. With those eyes gouged out, air defenses degraded sharply, and Iranian missiles began hitting their targets with near-perfect consistency using fewer and fewer munitions. Iran also shot down two American refueling aircraft and an AWACS — irreplaceable assets, at least in any near or medium-term strategic horizon — striking them over a Saudi airport in a move of almost contemptuous precision.

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Now meet their underwater cousins. You’ll grasp why Trump’s claims that Iran has no Air Force nor Navy anymore do not matter.

Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Iran has been preparing for the day the U.S. decides to strike. Their chosen strategy is asymmetrical. They refuse to fight America where America dominates: air and sea.

Iran has thus built a formidable conventional ballistic strike force and, crucially, what it calls a drone belt — a layered system designed to make any ground invasion extraordinarily costly, and to choke off the Strait of Hormuz indefinitely.

The Strait of Hormuz, for context, is 23 nautical miles across — roughly 42 km. The actual area that needs to be controlled to halt shipping? About 12 square kilometers. A postage stamp of ocean with trillion-dollar consequences.

Iran already demonstrated it could seal that stamp during the Tanker War of 1984–1988, by mining it. The problem with mines: they’re indiscriminate. Friendly and neutral vessels get blown up too. So Iran upgraded.

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Commençons par le pétrole. Non pas simplement comme source des carburants, mais comme l’une des matières premières fondamentales de la civilisation industrielle. Les raffineries ont été conçues, construites et calibrées pour le brut du Golfe persique — une norme historique qui remonte à la fin du XIXe siècle. Substituer d’autres qualités de brut n’est pas une mince affaire : cela exige des catalyseurs de craquage fluide, d’autres intrants coûteux, et une recalibration complète des procédés de raffinage. L’arrêt quasi-total de l’approvisionnement en brut du Golfe signifie une inflation sévère et garantie sur l’ensemble des produits dérivés du raffinage — c’est-à-dire, peu ou prou, tout.

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Start with oil. Not merely as a source of fuel, but as one the foundational feedstock of modern civilization. The world’s refineries were designed, built and calibrated around Persian Gulf crude — a historical standard dating to the late 19th century. Substituting other crude grades isn’t a switch you flip; it requires fluid cracking catalysts, other costly imputs and full refining process recalibration. The near-total halt of Gulf oil supply means severe, guaranteed inflation across every product derived from refining — which is to say, nearly everything.

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L’Express a publié sur X qu’Israël avait mobilisé 200 avions de chasse pour frapper Téhéran la nuit dernière. Deux secondes de recherche — deux secondes — suffisent à établir que l’armée de l’air israélienne ne dispose que de 175 appareils.

Mais ce n’est pas le pire. En cliquant sur l’article, l’information est rectifiée discrètement dans le chapeau : 80 appareils. Entre le poste X et l’article, 120 chasseurs fantômes. Ce n’est pas une erreur. C’est de la désinformation délibérée, industrielle, produite à la chaîne, sans la moindre honte.

Cela étant posé, passons aux choses sérieuses.

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Two seconds on any search or AI engine would have told the editors that the Israeli Air Force operates 175 combat aircraft with a range of 1000 km or more. You cannot send 200 planes you don’t have. Click through to the actual article and the number quietly shrinks to 80. That isn’t a typo. That’s a fabrication — and a brazen one. That’s deliberate desinformation.

Now, to the substance.

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Cluster munitions are antipersonnel weapons—designed to shred infantry in open fields, useless against buildings or military hardware. What Iran actually demonstrated was a new ballistic missile that, in its terminal phase, unleashes 80 thermal decoys to blind and saturate air defenses. The real warhead slips through while interceptors chase ghosts.

Why does this matter? Picture one of these missiles, preceded by a swarm of drones, vectoring toward a U.S. aircraft carrier. No effective interception. The carrier takes catastrophic damage—or worse, sinks.

As per today, no surface warship feels safe within a 2,000 km radius of Iranian shores. Game-changer.

We’re also constantly told Israel and the United States enjoy unchallenged air supremacy. Flat-out lie. Recall: Iran has already downed multiple American F-15s. Every U.S. and Israeli strike on Iranian soil comes from standoff range—cruise missiles off ships or distant aircraft. Direct overflights? Not happening.

Worse still, Iran has methodically gutted the American missile shield across the Middle East. Precision strikes knocked the four high-end X-band THAAD radars (the kind that cost $1.1 billion each) in the region. Result: Israel and its allies are effectively blind to incoming ballistic launches. Detection and early warning? Severely compromised. Satelittes aren’t just cutting it.

Meanwhile, Israel’s latest adventure—yet another incursion into southern Lebanon—is backfiring spectacularly. Hezbollah has wrecked at least eight Merkava tanks and hammered Israeli troop concentrations near the border. The ground offensive is bleeding.

Then there’s basic arithmetic the West pretends doesn’t exist. Intercepting a single incoming projectile requires two expensive anti-air missiles. An Iranian Shahed-2 drone? $20,000–50,000. A Patriot or other interceptor? $3 million minimum, up to $13 million. The economics are brutal: defenders bleed money while attackers spend pocket change.

All of this spells one unavoidable outcome: the Strait of Hormuz stays choked. No tanker wants an American escort right now—too dangerous. We’re barreling toward an energy crisis that will make the 1973 oil shock look like a minor hiccup. Global oil prices are already screaming.

Panic in the West is palpable. The U.S. has quietly greenlit India’s continued imports of Russian crude. Germany—yes, Germany—and the broader EU are now pressuring Ukraine to reopen Russian oil and gas pipelines through its territory. Zelenskyy, ever a petty mobster, is holding out for another €90 billion in European taxpayer cash as blackmail leverage. Time to admit the obvious: the current Kyiv regime is a liability that needs replacing—fast.

We told you to watch two key indicators in our last Sunday’s capsule: US missile stockpiles and crude oil prices. No genius required; the trajectory was obvious. Yet our so-called leaders and their spineless opposition remain dangerously clueless. They should be removed from power before they drag us further into catastrophe.

As for the 24/7 news channels—public and private alike—shut them all down. They don’t inform; they propagandize. And while we’re at it, think of the savings for the oligarchs who own them. None of these outlets are profitable.

Ce qu’on nous sert, c’est un conte de fées.

Dernier chapitre en date : l’Iran aurait pilonné Tel Aviv avec un missile à sous-munitions la nuit dernière. Absurde.

Les armes à sous-munitions sont des armes antipersonnel — conçues pour faucher de l’infanterie en rase campagne, sans effet sur des bâtiments ou du matériel militaire.

L’Iran a fait la démonstration d’un nouveau missile balistique manœuvrable qui, en phase finale de sa trajectoire, libère 80 leurres thermiques pour saturer et aveugler les défenses aériennes. La vraie ogive se faufile pendant que les intercepteurs chassent les leurres.

Pourquoi est-ce capital ? Imaginez un tel missile, précédé d’un essaim de drones, tiré sur un porte-avions américain. Aucune interception efficace possible. Le porte-avions subit des dommages catastrophiques, voire est coulé. Aucun navire de surface n’est aujourd’hui en sécurité dans un rayon de 2 000 km des côtes iraniennes. Changement de paradigme.

Etant donné que Téhéran a réduit en poussière la base de la 5e flotte américaine au Bahreïn, le point le plus proche de ravitaillement et de réarmement des bâtiments se situe à Diego Garcia, dans l’océan indien.

On nous répète aussi qu’Israël et les États-Unis jouissent d’une suprématie aérienne incontestée. Mensonge. Rappel : l’Iran a déjà abattu plusieurs F-15 américains et de multiples drones.

Chaque frappe américaine ou israélienne sur le sol iranien s’effectue à distance de sécurité, hors de portée de la défense anti-aérienne iranienne — missiles de croisière tirés depuis des navires ou des aéronefs. Des survols directs ? Hors de question. Même pas de bombardiers furtifs.

Plus grave encore : l’Iran a méthodiquement démantelé le bouclier antimissile américain au Moyen-Orient. Des frappes de précision ont mis hors service les quatre radars THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) de la région (qui coûtent 1,1 milliard de dollars pièce). Résultat : Israël et ses alliés sont définitivement aveugles face aux tirs balistiques. Détection et alerte précoce ? Gravement compromises.

Pendant ce temps, la dernière aventure israélienne — une nouvelle incursion dans le sud du Liban — tourne au fiasco. Le Hezbollah a mis hors combat au moins huit chars Merkava et pilonné les concentrations de troupes israéliennes à la frontière. Tsahal se fait une nouvelle fois botter le derrière.

Puis il y a l’arithmétique élémentaire que l’Occident feint d’ignorer. Intercepter un projectile ou un drone nécessite deux missiles antiaériens au moins. Un drone iranien Shahed-2 ? Entre 20 000 et 50 000 dollars. Un intercepteur Patriot ? Trois millions de dollars. Un intercepteur THAAD? Treize millions. Logique économique brutale: les défenseurs s’épuisent financièrement pendant que les attaquants dépensent des clopinettes.

Tout cela pointe vers un seule conclusion : le détroit d’Ormuz restera fermé. Aucun pétrolier n’a accepté d’être escorté par la marine américaine — trop dangereux, et pour cause. Nous fonçons vers une crise énergétique qui fera passer le choc pétrolier de 1973 pour de la gnognotte.

La panique en Occident est palpable. Les États-Unis ont discrètement autorisé l’Inde à continuer d’importer du brut russe. L’Allemagne — oui, l’Allemagne — et l’UE font pression sur l’Ukraine pour rouvrir les pipelines russo-ukrainiens. Zelensky, petit caïd vicieux, fait encore du chantage et exige les 90 milliards d’euros promis par le Conseil européen. Il est temps d’admettre l’évidence : le régime de Kiev est un boulet dont on doit vite se séparer.

Nous vous avons suggéré, dans notre capsule du 2 mars dernier, de surveiller deux indicateurs : les stocks de missiles américains et les prix du brut. Nul besoin d’être grand clerc pour prévoir ce qui était aisément prévisible. Pourtant nos dirigeants — et leurs oppositions invertébrées — n’ont rien vu venir.

Quant aux chaînes d’info en continu — publiques comme privées —, fermez-les toutes. Elles n’informent pas. Pensez aux économies pour ces chers oligarques qui les possèdent.

The clowns are back in town, would sing Thin Lizzy if the band were still active.

Every time the United States and Israel ignite another war, the same tired parade marches out: on 24/7 news channels, ignorant journalists racing against incompetent ‘experts’ who have been wrong about everything—from Ukraine to the Middle East—and yet still demand we consider them oracles.

The Middle East isn’t some neat European theater of war. It’s a hydra-headed mess of overlapping conflicts. Yet Washington and Tel Aviv, drunk on their own arrogance, thought decapitating the regime by assassinating Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei—along with dozens of senior clerics and officials—would make Iran collapse.

They were dead wrong.

Iran still stands. And it’s hitting back—hard.

Let’s get one thing straight: Iran is not a theocracy run by mullahs in a vacuum. It has a president elected by universal suffrage, a government accountable to a unicameral parliament (the Majlis), and elected legislators. The Majlis dates back to 1905—long before the 1979 Revolution.

Khamenei was never head of state; that role belongs to the elected president of the Islamic Republic.

Killing a few dozen people, even the top cleric, does not topple institutions built on political—not purely religious—foundations.

And in Shia Islam—the faith of martyrs since Karbala—what did they expect? National unity? Rally-around-the-flag? Exactly what we’re witnessing: most Iranians closing ranks behind their country and its insitutions.

Those much-hyped “decapitation strikes” achieved nothing of the sort. Iran’s retaliation unfolded precisely as Tehran promised: direct hits on Israel and on every U.S. regional base used to launch the initial assault.

The Americans and Israelis, as usual, underestimated their opponent. They never learn.

To track where this disaster is headed, watch two key indicators.

Short-term: stocks of anti-air missiles held by the United States, Israel, and Gulf monarchies hosting American bases. Supplies are already razor-thin. The Pentagon reportedly warned Trump against this adventure because they couldn’t sustain more than a few weeks. That’s why he keeps talking about a “four-week war.”

Remember the 12-day war? Israel barely lasted that long—even with Gulf states feeding Patriot missiles to intercept Iranian ballistic and drone salvos.

Now, after Iran has deliberately struck those same Gulf bases, no Arab regime will risk handing over interceptors. Tehran knows its ballistic and drone arsenals outmatch the other side’s defenses. All Iran has to do is absorb damage, wait for the interceptors to run dry, then—if needed—sink a few U.S. ships and finish flattening Israel.

Medium-term (3–6 months): Oil and gas prices.

Brent crude at $100 means at least $3/gallon gas in the U.S.—political suicide for Trump six months before midterms.

We’ve already seen European LNG prices double after Qatar halted production to protect its facilities from Iranian strikes.

For the Trump administration, spiking fuel costs spell electoral doom.

For Europe, Japan, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, it’s an economic death sentence—no reindustrialization, no growth, just stagnation or worse.

Yet here we are, with attempts to drag Europe - that is the UK, Germany and France - into a war that isn’t ours—one that’s already lost.

The single strategic gravity point of this entire illegal aggression (a blatant violation of international law and even U.S. statutes) is transparent: to shield a war criminal—Benjamin Netanyahu—from corruption trials and prison.

The empire’s hubris is on full display once again. Iran isn’t folding. It’s enduring, retaliating, and waiting for the West’s finite munitions and political will to collapse under the weight of reality.

The circus may be loud, but the show is ending badly—for everyone but the architects who never pay the price.

1 - L’état des stocks de munitions antiaériennes.

En juin 2025, Israël et l’Occident avaient tenu dix jours face à la riposte iranienne. D’où une guerre perdue, qui n’en dura que douze.

Si les stocks ont été reconstitués depuis, nous sources nous indiquent que leur niveau n’est pas supérieur à celui de l’année dernière. Les Iraniens le savent, et donc ripostent tout en encaissant les coups, ce qu’ils font bien mieux que nous Occidentaux. Si d’aventure les choses ne s’amélioraient pas, ils pourront alors sérieusement endommager voir couler des bâtiments de guerre américains et oblitérer des infrastructures critiques en Israël. Le temps est du côté de Téhéran.

2 - Le prix du pétrole et du gaz.

Cent dollars le baril de brent, c’est à brève échéance plus de 3 dollars le gallon (3,8 litres) aux USA, une année d’élection intermédiaire. Mort politique de l’administration Trump.

Le Qatar ayant fermé l’ensemble de sa capacité de production de gaz liquéfié afin de la préserver de frappes iraniennes, le prix spot du gaz en Europe a doublé en l’espace de trente minutes. Autant dire au revoir à toute croissance économique, à toute “réindustrialisation”, et bonjour le racket américain puisque l’Europe s’est intelligemment coupée de son approvisionnement en gaz russe.