[ Editorial ] Nuclear Dissolution
Sharing French nuclear deterrence is a legal and political impossibility. What is Emmanuel Macron playing at?

Emmanuel Macron is at it again. Since 2018, he has been obsessed with sharing France’s nuclear deterrence. A nonsensical and dangerous game. Our article from April, 29th, 2024.
Emmanuel Macron keeps on pushing his intricate case for sharing France’s nuclear deterrence with fellow EU member states.
Such a move is unfeasible. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) explicitly forbids the transfer of nuclear weapons, their command and control mechanisms, or any associated military technology. The term "weapons" here refers to weapon systems or parts thereof.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), formalized on July 1, 1968 and effective from March 5, 1970, rests on three foundational principles: preventing proliferation, advancing disarmament, and promoting peaceful nuclear energy applications. It bars the five recognized nuclear powers—those that detonated a nuclear device prior to January 1, 1967, namely the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, China, and France—from sharing nuclear materials or expertise with non-nuclear-weapon states. These non-nuclear states, in return, pledge not to pursue or produce nuclear arms. Compliance with these commitments is monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
This explains why former Soviet republics such as Ukraine and Kazakhstan, as a prerequisite for gaining independence, had to relinquish all nuclear weapons (and other weapons of mass destruction) to The Russian Federation, recognized as the USSR’s lone successor. Suggesting that the European Union could similarly inherit nuclear capabilities of a France that no longer exists is a legal and political non-starter.
Every EU member state has signed the NPT, which bars them from acquiring or developing nuclear arms while allowing civilian nuclear energy programs under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supervision. Against this backdrop, the Polish president’s persistent requests to host nuclear weapons on Polish territory underscore a striking lapse in judgment. These appeals jeopardize Poland’s costly initiative to build a nuclear power plant , recently contracted to Westinghouse.
Consider this: if France were to deploy nuclear warheads in Poland, it could leverage their presence to strong-arm Warsaw into aligning with its policies under the threat of withdrawal. Poland might then turn to Washington for solace, but such pleas would fall on deaf ears. The United States, wary of Poland’s belligerence, thinly veiled territorial ambitions, and paranoia, would hardly be so foolish as to place nuclear weapons in the hands of such an unpredictable partner.
The European Union, lacking sovereign statehood, has no realistic path to a UN Security Council seat—despite Olaf Scholz’s aspirations. Russia and China would block any such move, perceiving the EU as a mere extension of NATO, barring a major overhaul of the UN Charter. Against this backdrop, revising the NPT to accommodate the fanciful notions of a French president, whose credibility is faltering globally, is beyond contemplation.
Sharing French nuclear deterrence would jeopardize the security of both the European Union as a whole and France. Should an EU member—Germany, Poland, or a Baltic state, for instance—take actions deemed an existential threat by Russia, the retaliation would not fall on Berlin, Warsaw, or Vilnius. Paris would bear the brunt, as the authority to launch nuclear weapons cannot be delegated.
The idea of equipping other EU nations with long-range missiles—enabling them to wield nuclear-capable delivery systems while technically staying non-nuclear (a concept Macron might be borrowing from Iran)—is even more reckless. This would collapse the strategic depth of NATO, inviting Russia and/or China to launch coordinated strikes across all major EU member states. Both possess the means, including hypersonic capabilities, to execute such an attack, and no effective countermeasures exist to date.
What is Emmanuel Macron up to? He grasps little of regalian issues or dismisses them outright, yet it strains credulity to think he’s ignorant of the dynamics laid out here.
Multiple nations would benefit from seeing French nuclear deterrence absorbed and nullified within the EU. The United States leads the pack, already holding Britain’s nuclear arsenal firmly in its grip while lacking any leverage over France’s independent deterrent. Credible reports indicate sustained U.S. pressure toward this end since Joe Biden took office in 2020. Germany, too, has a stake—its elite, more obsequious to Washington than even France’s, resent Paris’ nuclear advantage, a privilege the NPT bars them from matching, fueling lingering Germanic imperial frustrations. Berlin and Warsaw compete fiercely to be Washington’s foremost proxy, a rivalry that has veered into farce, as Germany’s mute response to the Nord Stream sabotage starkly demonstrates.
So, what’s in it for Emmanuel Macron ? With Total, the French oil major, mulling a departure from Paris to list on Wall Street, citing its American-dominated ownership, why hasn’t the French state secured a blocking stake in this linchpin of national interest? Recall the Alstom sale: Macron willingly offloaded a cornerstone of France’s civilian and military nuclear capabilities to U.S. hands, padding the pockets of Paris insiders—many of whom later funded his 2017 campaign.
Is this a ploy to divert attention from France’s economic woes and spiraling state finances, battered by seven years of Macron’s policies—or twelve, if we count his role as deputy secretary-general at the Élysée from 2012, where he engineered the CICE, funneling 40 billion euros yearly to shareholders with no gain for jobs or competitiveness?
Does Macron envision himself as the EU’s unelected leader, pandering to Baltic, Nordic, and Polish fears over France’s national interest, chasing backing that Germany will never offer?
> Does Macron envision himself as the EU’s unelected leader?
The nuclear card is one that even Macron can't play successfully. I think your article makes that clear. However, Macron would like France to punch above its weight since by extension this would reflect well on Macron himself. Like all the current European leaders (except for Orban and Fico) his popularity is being dragged under water by President Trump. Of course, it is not only Trump; their belligerent rhetoric against Russia is cause enough.
I've addressed the question whether Europe will soon comply with the new American foreign policy here: https://mrothschild.substack.com/p/deep-meaning-of-zelensky-trump-oval
I would ask you if you agree with my conclusion. Will European leaders soon abandon their current rhetoric and become docile American clients again?