[ Energy Cris] Prof. Friedrich Wagner : "Germany is not able to reduce its CO2 emission"
One of the world's foremost experts in plasma physics dives deep into flawed and unsound energy policies. Renewables are not the path forward.
Here are Prof. Friedrich Wagner’s original replies in writing and in English. This interview of the Max Planck institute’s authoritative physicist was previously published in French.
L’Eclaireur : You are an expert in plasma physics. You have produced authoritative research in the field of fusion. How did you come about taking interest into renewable energy ?
Friedrich Wagner - Because of the tremendous development of renewable capacities in Germany and the high expectations of a complete electricity supply thereby, I started to wonder whether my field, fusion research, can still be justified. This was around 2010. When I tried to find an answer to my concerns, I recognized that the available material did not allow to discriminate between solid scientific facts and mere lobby-efforts. I started to do my own analysis with the scientific methodologies I once have learned, I presented my results to the energy groups of the German and the European Physical Societies and ultimately published them in refereed journals. In total, I deal with the so called “Energiewende” since more than 10 years now.
L’Eclaireur - How do you assess Germany's policy choice in 2002 to phase out nuclear power generation and rely on a mix of massive development of renewable energies, gas and maintaining coal?
Friedrich Wagner - In 2002, the coalition between the social-democratic (SPD) and the Green party decided to phase out nuclear power; in 2010, the conservative (CDU/CSU) and the liberal party (FDP) decided to prolong the use of nuclear power; in 2011, right after the Fukushima accident, the same coalition decided to reduce nuclear power in steps and to finally phase it out end of 2022. These political decisions were fully agreed by the public. The possible electricity shortage during this winter enforced a further decision – this time by the coalition of SPD/Green party/FDP - to prolong the operation of the remaining 3 nuclear power stations (4.1 GW) till the middle of April 2023. The 2002 and the 2010 decisions followed the respective party positions toward nuclear power; the 2011 decision was also driven by different party politics because the issue interfered with the political interest in local state elections in Germany. Only this year’s decision is based on energy related concerns – a possible electricity shortage this winter.
Now, my assessment: I consider it as a mistake to stop nuclear power use and the accompanying research in Germany. I think that highly industrialized countries like Germany should employ nuclear power in parallel to renewables to meet the Paris agreement and to maintain its industrial basis. German industry developed the Convoy reactor type, which demonstrated high operational safety, reliability, and availability. The last 3 of them are terminated now after 35 years of operational life-time. While Germany moves out of its own nuclear power stations, those once exported by German nuclear industry in the 70-ies continue to operate in the Netherlands, in Switzerland, in Spain and in South America. Germany disregards its own products which are still appreciated by others.
The most critical consequence of the German nuclear power policy is that Germany is not able to reduce its CO2 emission as it possibly could. The CO2-free operation of renewable technologies does not pay-off because one clean technology is replaced by another one. As a consequence, Germany is still the largest CO2 emitter in Europe and one of the largest in terms of per-capita emission. After the destruction of the Nordstream pipe lines to Russia Germany is forced to burn more coal, specifically more of the locally available lignite, the dirtiest form of coal. The national CO2 footprint will further grow and the international trust in the green efforts of Germany will further decline.
There is striking difference in environmental quality between France and Germany: over about 40 years, France emitted about 300 Mill tons of CO2 less per year than Germany. This is a tremendous achievement mostly thanks to the use of nuclear power in France, a quality which the green movements in Germany tend to ignore but, at the end, is acknowledged now by Europe via the EU-green energy taxonomy process.
L’Eclaireur : What are the limitations to this policy, technically, industrially, economically speaking in both German and European context?
Friedrich Wagner - A renewable electricity supply system requires hundreds of GW of wind and photovoltaic (PV) power (maybe 600 GW), in addition, a backup system with a power capacity close to the future load, 1000s of km of new power lines and installations to import and to distribute hydrogen (in which form soever). On the demand side, the 600 GW must be distributed to electrolysers for hydrogen production, possibly devoted storage systems, classical industries having replaced their traditional technologies (e.g. Chemistry industry in Germany demands 628 TWh electricity – about 50% more than the French nuclear generation) and all other consumers.
The technical limitations of the policy to resort to renewable energies only are caused by the two main features of wind and solar power – (1) low power density requiring a lot of space and material (partly rare minerals) to collect enough energy and (2) intermittent power generation necessitating a second set of supply systems to meet the demand in lull-periods e.g. during the night or in winter when the PV power system basically fails. The available space for wind and PV panels is too small in Germany given the local weather conditions and the high population density. Only part of the future energy needs can be provided by renewable technologies (the French situation is more favorable - more hydro power, longer Atlantic coast, more sun, lower population density). It will not be possible to import the missing electricity of several 100 TWh in 2045 from Europe. The expected additional demand of Germany surpasses by far the present generation and distribution potential.
Industry: The German nuclear power industry (and its scientific backbone) was destroyed by the political decisions and will not be able (and is not willing) to organise a revival of nuclear power. The PV power industry has been lost mostly to China; the wind turbine industry suffers economically for years now. The renewable power industry is based on tremendous subsidies provided by the electricity consumers and recently by the tax payers. This is not the foundation for an economically sustainable development and only helps short-term political interests. Further unsolved industrial problems are to adjust all processes to electricity supplied by unpredictable weather conditions replacing the principle of “supply by demand”.
Economy: The economic basis of Germany is manufacturing industry, which requires access to sufficient and cheap energy. This provided, Germany was able to finance all its social programmes, surpassing € 1000 billion a year. Energy will never be as cheap as it was for Germany (and Europe). This is different for the USA (at present lower by a factor 5-10 for gas and electricity) and may also be different for Asian countries as soon as Russian gas and oil can be transported to the customers of the future. Major German industry is investing more in China and the USA than within Germany (e.g. BASF). A loss of energy-intensive industry must be expected leading to a general de-industrialisation of Germany with all social and financial consequences.
L’Eclaireur: What are the main hurdles to the development of renewable energies to meet the 100% objective 2045? Is this even realistic? If not, why?
Friedrich Wagner - One hurdle is the embarrassingly slow administrative processes in Germany. There is no need for me to give examples, they are infamous. Also, the Germans have developed the disposition and have accordingly been trained by interested political circles to first demonstrate against all forms of public investments. This attitude has also been adopted by media and the judicial system. To set-up a wind turbine may last seven years. To meet the 2045 goals the annual expansion rate for onshore-, offshore wind and photovoltaic capacities must be increase by factors 3 to 4 (repowering included) compared to the average expansion rates of the last 10 years. This is mission impossible, specifically with the currentt manpower shortage, which will stay and the existing early retirement programmes, which will further reduce the overall workforce in Germany. But as stated above, meeting the 2045 goals will be impossible with the overall renewable potential of Germany.
L’Eclaireur : it seems little is heard about capacity roll-out constraints when it comes to generation and storage, specially with regards to wind power generation. Have studies evaluated the number of wind turbines needed to meet continuous vs. peak demand? What storage is required to achieve that ?
Friedrich Wagner - In Germany, about 29,000 onshore and about 1,500 offshore wind mills establish 56 GW power and 7.8 GW, respectively. The onshore potential of Germany is limited to about 2% of her area allowing about 150 to 200 GW. The offshore potential is about 60-70 GW. Depending on the future technology development, Germany has to operate between 50,000 and 70,000 wind mills of about 200 meter high0.. They may be able to produce 300 – 400 TWh el1ectricity - comparable to the French nuclear generation. But there is a large difference. Wind electricity is fluctuating and of low economic value, nuclear generation is on demand and therefore precious.
There are two classes of storage – short-term storage for grid control possibly realized by batteries and long-term, seasonal storage. The seasonal storage size depends on renewable generation and the level of the future load, which is unknown. Nevertheless, seasonal storage has to be in the range of several 10s of TWh. As a consequence, storage serving only Germany and realized in the form of pumped hydro storage surpasses the potential of all European mountain areas. The only meaningful way seems to be chemical storage based on hydrogen or its derivatives.
A storage system fed by intermittent generation is served by surplus electricity in the form of the power peaks of the renewable generation system (the main generation is directly fed into the grid and used). Under these circumstances, a large storage system of several TWh capacity and dedicated exclusively to electricity has no economic basis.
L’Eclaireur : Are these studies (storage capacities) taken into account in policy making ? Are such studies swept the carpet if not fitting the "narrative"?
Friedrich Wagner - The storage development in Germany is still in its infancy and the components are developed and tested in the 10-100 MW range. It is generally accepted that storage will be necessary. The price difference of primary renewable electricity and secondary storage electricity and its consequences on private behavior and industrial planning are not considered to my knowledge. As storage requires a large amount of surplus electricity its implementation is far into the future and presently not in the attention cone of the public and the politicians. Swept under the carpet are all favorable aspects of nuclear power. This has become obvious during the discussion on the continuation of nuclear power operation till spring next year or even more so during the recent hearings on this subject by the petitions committee of the German parliament .
L’Eclaireur : In France, analysts are increasingly pointing at Germany’s role in the "destruction" of the French energy system based on nuclear power generation, with a view to become Europe's energy hub with gas (Nordstream 1 &2), electricity prices being peg to its price. What is your take on such statements?
Friedrich Wagner - My French friends are aware of this perspective and consider the closing of the nuclear power station of Fessenheim, following German pressure, as a mistake, specifically facing the present shortage of nuclear power. I understand that the decision to cut nuclear electricity production down to 50% of the total generation was made during the socialist government but has, meanwhile, been overruled by a strategy to maintain nuclear power and to even consider the construction of new ones. I think that Germany will not be able to maintain this pressure, - after the EU-green energy taxonomy regulation, - after the decisions of many European countries to expand nuclear power operation and even consider building new ones, - after the notable progress of waste disposal in Finland and Switzerland, - after the demonstration that Germany badly needs fossil fuels to get over this winter, - and, finally, with the growing recognition that the “Energiewende” could be a failure.
The idea of a Germany strategy to use the gas of Nordstream 1 and 2 to push the electricity price to the highest value according to the merit-order principle is new to me. Of course, a high electricity price for all-Europe is in the interest of German green politics because the operation of a renewable electricity system will be very costly though “the sun does not send a bill”. I am not astonished that speculations like this one can emerge as the logic of a politically mediated strong dependence of Germany on Russian gas and the destructive consequences of the two pipelines in the Baltic Sea on the economic well being of the Ukraine are difficult to follow. Such a strategy – if indeed existed – is destroyed now like the pipelines are.