NATO Is Rife with Corruption
Investigations by at least six NATO member states reveal deep corruption within the alliance's bureaucracy, particularly in the NSPA, its support and procurement agency.
NATO is not merely a military alliance but a sprawling supranational bureaucracy that has operated quite unchecked on continental Europe since its founding, often undermining the interests of its non anglo-saxon members and interfering in their domestic affairs.
The “stay-behind” networks, formed after World War II with former fascists, nazis, and collaborators recycled by the British and the Americans to counter a potential Soviet invasion, are a prime example. These paramilitary groups drove the “strategy of tension” in Europe during the 1970s and 1980s, fueling bloody eras like Italy’s Years of Lead, where far-right terrorist attacks killed far more people than those perpetrated by far-left groups.
Every single external operation NATO has undertaken, in breach of its defensive alliance mandate, has ended in failure. The 1999 bombing of Serbia and the independence of Kosovo remain a costly disaster 25 years later. The ISAF mission in Afghanistan ended in defeat against insurgents wearing sandals and shalwar kameez. And, the cherry on the more-than-a-million pile of bodies and ruined European economies, the ongoing war in Ukraine.
Like other unchecked bureaucracies, such as the UN and the European Commission, NATO pursues its own goals. Its primary focus is expanding its influence and power. As a supranational organization, it escapes accountability.
Evidence now shows NATO is deeply corrupt.
One example is the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA), an executive agency based in Luxembourg with over 1,200 employees. The NSPA, handles:
Acquisition and management of weapons systems throughout their life cycle
Provision of logistics and project management
Support of operations and exercises
Management of fuel supplies
Oversight of strategic transportation and storage
The NSPA serves as a vast procurement center, maintaining a catalog of NATO-approved equipment, weapons, ammunition, consumables, and contractors. This enables member nations to buy through the agency with confidence, avoiding time-consuming and expensive evaluation processes, which the NSPA conducts. It ensures compliance with STANAG (Standardization Agreement) protocols, which standardize ammunition, equipment, procedures, and terminology across NATO members to ensure interoperability.
The NSPA is a vital resource for smaller nations without advanced defense acquisition systems like those of the U.S. or France, but it also runs a 7 billion euro buget for NATO operation-related purchases, alongside managing a significant portion of member states’ defense procurement. Such a captive market, coupled with government contracts, breeds significant corruption risks.
Consider a scenario where you’re the official tasked with approving suppliers for 5.56 NATO assault rifle ammunition. In this role, you could demand hefty bribes to expedite supplier approval and further payments to manipulate member states’ bidding processes to favor specific suppliers. And you’d be based in Luxemburg.
A major scandal involving the procurement of maritime fuel and ammunitions, first exposed by La Lettre , continues to unfold. These contracts, valued at hundreds of millions of euros, have triggered criminal investigations in Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Spain, and Italy, leading to multiple arrests. The director of the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA), Stacy Cummings, faces an internal investigation, and U.S. authorities have recently launched their own inquiry.
Manipulated supplier approvals or contracts could compromise the quality of critical supplies. In wartime, defective or substandard munitions—such as anti-aircraft missiles, anti-tank weapons, or 155mm artillery shells—could prove deadly.
For defense industries, corruption in such a pivotal procurement hub risks eroding confidence. Winning any big contract under these circumstances could invite suspicion from buyers and competitors.
Efforts by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte to contain the fallout and limit further scrutiny of the NSPA by member states’ judiciaries, are ill-advised. Rutte’s push for NATO members to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP will in turn increase the reliance of smaller NATO member states on the NSPA for cost-effective and reliable procurement. A breakdown in this supply chain caused by a breach of trust, could severely hamper NATO’s military readiness. As General Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower’s chief of staff in World War II, aptly stated, “Amateurs talk strategy; professionals talk logistics.”
Finally, we should note another massive arms market established by the European Union through the European Peace Facility (EPF), with a view to supply weapons to Ukraine, Europe’s most corrupt country. Modeled on the NSPA, it is far worse as it relies on a compensation system rather than direct procurement. This mechanism is likely to be at least as rife with corruption as the NATO agency. We raised these concerns at the outset of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict in these terms.
The EFP scheme is primed for malfeasance and opaque transactions. Consider a plausible scenario: a member state offloads surplus arms to a commercial intermediary, repurchases them at an inflated price for onward transfer to Ukraine, and subsequently seeks reimbursement from the EPF. With defense transactions exempt from public procurement oversight and frequently cloaked in confidentiality, profits accrue with minimal to no scrutiny.
Everyone should read “War is a Racket” by U.S. Marine Corps Major General Smedley D. Butler, a compelling critique of war profiteering. Here it is, no excuse to overlook it.