The Last Stand of The Manned Combat Aircraft

The downing of Rafales along the India-Pakistan border goes beyond a simple military incident. According to aerospace and defense expert Jean-François Geneste, its origins run much deeper

The F-35 is the most flawed combat aircraft ever built and a con job. Do manned aircrafts still have any purpose, besides air space control?

Two weeks after Operation Sindoor, India’s retaliatory strikes on Pakistan following the April 22 attack that claimed 26 lives in Indian-administered Kashmir, uncertainty persists about how many aircraft—especially French-made Rafales—were downed by Pakistani air defense.

One? Three? And what caused these losses? The answers matter greatly. For India, which operated 36 Rafales before May 7 and expects 26 more, and for Dassault, now facing Indonesia’s decision to pause its order of 42 fighter jets.

Yet, reducing this incident to a mere military setback, even one involving France’s premier defense asset, misses the broader picture. According to Jean-François Geneste, the roots of the issue are far deeper.

“Decades of misguided policies, compounded by financially driven consolidation, technological compromises, eroded independence, deliberate or induced subordination, and rampant financialization, have led to this,” he argues.

With nearly four decades of expertise in aerospace, space, and defense, including roles at Matra System and a decade as Chief Technology Officer director at EADS (now Airbus Group), Geneste now heads Warpa, a startup recently awarded a patent for a groundbreaking space propulsion engine with infinite specific impulse.

In our opinion column, authors’ views are their own and do not reflect L’Eclaireur’s stance, except for our commitment to providing a platform for diverse perspectives to foster pluralism and a deeper understanding of global issues.

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1 - Introduction

The defense community is grappling with the fallout from the Indo-Pakistani conflict, where at least one French-made Rafale—and possibly three—was reportedly shot down, according armees.com.

This analysis, probing the failures of a flagship defense asset, uncovers deeper issues. The report cites Chinese missiles traveling at Mach 4, yet the PL-15’s documented speed is Mach 5. Why the discrepancy? Is it to obscure that Mach 5 marks the hypersonic threshold—a capability Western nations are struggling to match, unlike their rivals? Scientifically, Mach 5 is a critical boundary in aerothermodynamics, where new equations and technologies are required as traditional approximations fail.

Moreover, the claim that a Mach 4 missile covers 50 km in 10 seconds is misleading. Calculations show ~42 seconds at high altitude (-40°C) and ~39 seconds at sea level (15°C). At Mach 5, it’s ~34 and 30 seconds, respectively. Armées.com’s apparent attempt to downplay the threat to the Rafale is misguided, as 40 seconds allows pilots some reaction time.

In this provocative paper, we reassess Western armament strategies through a critical lens, hoping to spark reform, however unlikely, to bolster collective security.

2 - The Rafale and Air Power

A combat aircraft’s effectiveness hinges on maneuverability, but this is constrained by human pilots. Accelerations, measured in “g” (9.81 m/s² at sea level), are the limiting factor: pilots can handle ~10 g briefly, while missiles sustain 50 g. The outcome is clear.

This is well-established. Western fighters like the Rafale are designed for ~13 g, but pilots limit performance. In the past, human control was essential due to rudimentary electronics and communications. Now, lightweight electronics, AI-driven autonomy, and secure satellite or laser links enable drones to surpass human capabilities in speed and decision-making.

Yet, France and Germany are committed to the SCAF, a system pairing a manned jet with 4–6 drones for enhanced combat effectiveness. Consider an adversary’s perspective: why target 50 g-capable drones when the 10 g-limited manned jet—the system’s core—is the weak link? This flaw is obvious, yet seems lost on Euroatlantic defense planners. Political and ideological alignment, particularly within NATO and EU frameworks, risks compounding this error.

The SCAF, slated for 2040, is already conceptually obsolete in 2025, threatening Euroatlantic air superiority.

3 - Systemic Challenges

Systems engineering, originating in the United States during the space race to counter Soviet advances, created a sprawling, pseudo-scientific framework, peaking with the Apollo moon landing. Today, it’s a cornerstone of defense industries, driven by U.S.-led military contracts, yet remains empirical and has produced little breakthrough innovation for decades.

Simply put, fully implementing this methods would drain budgets and lead to technical failures.

The Western arms industry, especially its American core, has been criticized for prioritizing profits over effective products. Systems engineering exacerbates this, acting like an overzealous bureaucracy that inflates costs while delivering subpar outcomes.

Consider a revealing case: the ISO quality standards (e.g., ISO 9000), once touted as guarantees of excellence. In the Anglo-Saxon mindset—dominant in defense—certification ensures only specification compliance, not performance. A colleague once inspected a certified thermal camera, only to find it substandard, with fingerprints on its optics.

This approach clashes with European, particularly French, engineering traditions. France’s “système D”—a knack for ingenious improvisation—has waned but historically drove remarkable achievements. Adopting Anglo-Saxon methods has stifled this creativity, a trend defense industries must reverse to remain competitive.

Armées.com suggests Pakistan’s edge in the Indo-Pakistani conflict came from a cohesive, Chinese-built system, unlike India’s fragmented, multi-source arsenal.

This may hold true, though data is limited. Yet, systems engineering struggles to define “systems.” It boasts of “systems of systems,” delivering polished presentations, but its products—like those exposed in Ukraine—often falter in real-world conflicts.

A key issue is the field’s lack of modelization. Without formal models, mastery is elusive. Career paths in systems engineering favor managers focused on budgets over technicians tackling complex problems, stifling innovation.

Proposals to modelize for rigorous, logical solutions to emerge, threaten entrenched interests and are sidelined.

Yet, systems are ubiquitous. A biological cell is a system; its nucleus is another at a different scale. The more possibilities a system encompasses, the more comprehensive its mathematical framework must be, leading to complex doctrines.

Could China have pioneered a scientific, non-empirical systems engineering? Their apparent dominance in the Indo-Pakistani clash raises this critical question for Western defense planners.

4 - The Misguided Push for a War Economy

Western leaders have recently emphasized transitioning to a war economy, citing an ostensibly aggressive Russia. Yet, Russia poses no immediate threat to NATO or the EU, largely due to its demographic constraints. For France, historical Russian affinity for its culture—when it was vibrant—further diminishes the likelihood of conflict.

The problem is the Euroatlantic push for mass production to counter a fabricated adversary. Current armaments, as evidenced in recent conflicts, are often inadequate. Producing obsolete equipment in a region marred by corruption fuels concerns of mismanagement and waste.

A rational defense strategy would begin with a rigorous threat assessment, identifying true adversaries—geopolitical, strategic, or otherwise—and tailoring capabilities accordingly. Instead, the current approach lacks coherence.

Consider a telling case: proposals for a second French aircraft carrier. Russia’s Zircon missile, traveling at Mach 9 with a 1,000+ km range, renders carriers vulnerable and outdated. Against a land-based power like Russia, a carrier offers little strategic value. Carriers are tools of power projection, not defense, hinting at offensive or neo-colonial aims. For France, a former colonial power, such ambitions raise questions about alignment with values of stability and sovereignty. NATO and EU leaders must clarify whether such projects serve collective security or narrower agendas, as public support may waver

5 - The Intellectual Race in Competitiveness

In a world of relentless global competition, Euroatlantic nations recognize that rivalry among populations borders on warfare. Human intellect drives this contest, with education as its starting point.

The Euroatlantic education system is pitted against global peers. The failure to develop hypersonic missiles—evident in both the U.S. and Europe—stems from intellectual shortcomings. Yet, education reforms are stagnant. Euroatlantic countries, including France, languish in PISA rankings, which, while limited to rote knowledge and standardized problem-solving, highlight a decline. France’s curricula, even in elite preparatory classes, no longer teach reasoning, unlike in the past. Worse, mass education fails to nurture the truly innovative—those with original ideas.

The Euroatlantic tendency to sideline creative problem-solvers, like France’s “système D” innovators, is a loss. Cultivating their ingenuity alongside rigorous reasoning could propel Euroatlantic nations to global leadership. Instead, the education system demands a complete rethink to restore competitiveness.

6 - Sovereignty and Dependence

It’s striking that China is framed as a primary adversary, yet NATO and EU nations rely heavily on it for critical resources.

This dependency, particularly in defense, is systemic. No western government treats its nation as a system with controllable inputs, outputs, and dependencies. A Chinese cutoff of rare earths during a conflict would cripple the Euroatlantic bloc: no smartphones, computers, vehicle electronics, or batteries. The COVID crisis exposed similar vulnerabilities in pharmaceuticals.

Decades of profit-driven policies have birthed a globalized elite whose interests misalign with national priorities, often answering to Washington or, potentially, Beijing. This erodes sovereignty, leaving governments—and their citizens—subservient.

Change requires public action, but European populations are pacified by oligarch-controlled media, despite economic decline. Some suspect this downturn was orchestrated to block a return to sovereignty.

A sovereign defense is essential but absent. European federalists argue sovereignty lies at the EU level, but this is misguided. Other European elites are even more beholden to external powers than France, where echoes of past autonomy persist. NATO and the EU must prioritize strategic independence to counter these vulnerabilities.

7 - The Industrial Base

The Ukraine conflict underscores the vital role of a robust industrial ecosystem and a workforce capable of supporting defense efforts. We’ve emphasized education’s centrality, but capitalistic dynamics demand equal attention.

This challenge has historical roots. Post-World War II, the Euroatlantic aerospace sector teemed with firms, as chronicled in History of Aviation for France. In the 1950s–60s, governments streamlined the industry, favoring giants like Dassault and Aérospatiale over competitors, fostering a monolithic design philosophy.

Boeing’s “family” concept for civilian aircraft, prioritizing cost over innovation, set a precedent that shaped Airbus. Compare the 1952 Caravelle to the A350-1000 ULR: progress has been incremental, not revolutionary. Few engineers today can design an aircraft from scratch without mimicking Airbus, Boeing, or emerging rivals like COMAC. The industry chases marginal gains, with costs rising exponentially for minimal competitive edges.

Contrast this with hypersonic missiles, born outside Euroatlantic norms. How many innovative proposals from European or U.S. engineers were dismissed?

In the 1990s, the U.S. consolidated its defense industry into behemoths—Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin. Europe, often emulating its transatlantic partner, followed with EADS (now Airbus Group), KNDS, and others. This distanced engineers from decision-makers. Unlike engineer-leaders like Marcel Dassault or Jean-Luc Lagardère, today’s executives are finance-driven “career directors.”

In France, a distinct pattern persists: graduates of ENA or École Polytechnique spend years as political staffers before landing CEO roles at state-linked firms, leading seasoned engineers despite lacking technical depth.

What transformative innovations have these consolidated giants produced recently? Name one. Did tech titans like GAFAM emerge from such structures? No.

Consider two landmarks. In the space sector, who envisioned low-orbit satellite constellations? Motorola, an outsider. Who realized it? Elon Musk, a PayPal alumnus. When Ariane dominated due to NASA’s shuttle miscalculation, who slashed orbital costs by 12.5 times in two decades? Musk again.

Consolidation has stifled ingenuity. Alarmingly, oversight bodies like NATO or EU defense agencies remain oblivious. Around 2020, a French startup, backed by military institutions, proposed a vehicle engine slashing fuel use by 3.5 times. The Defense Innovation Agency rejected it. Such cases are legion.

Another example reveals systemic flaws. In 2019, France’s DGA, wary of China’s quantum radar advances, rallied Dassault, CEA, ONERA, and Thales. The result? Reportedly, just a postdoc’s funding. Quantum radars, like hypersonics, risk catching NATO and the EU unprepared when adversaries showcase battlefield dominance, with R&D trailing their mass production.

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8 - The Defense Collapse

This analysis isn’t exhaustive, nor does it aim to be. We hope its brevity still conveys the gravity of the situation. The Western defense system, including France’s once-proud armaments sector, is crumbling. Decades of misguided policies—driven by financial consolidation, technological compromises, eroded independence, acquiescent or engineered subordination, and unchecked financialization—have brought us here.

In civilian industries, price competition at a given performance level drives cost-cutting in components, labor, and processes.

Consider a vivid analogy: you envision a dream home with sprawling rooms, perfect heating and cooling, gold fixtures, marble floors, and luxurious drapes. Budget constraints force compromises—average fixtures, smaller rooms, standard systems—yielding a mediocre home unless you’re exceptionally wealthy.

In defense, mediocrity is defeat. Supremacy is non-negotiable. Yet, Western nations, seduced by financial logic, have produced average systems. The result? Adversaries like China and Russia surpass us. Congratulations—you prioritized budgets and got subpar results!

Risk-taking is absent. Beyond recent hypersonic efforts, name a Western project that failed due to bold technical ambition. None exist. Instead, we fund unwieldy conglomerates peddling costly, ineffective systems (e.g., Ariane vs. SpaceX). New entrants are stifled, unlike in the U.S., where disruptors occasionally thrive.

In France, and much of the Euroatlantic sphere, startups are propped up with grants only to be absorbed by giants. Innovators pitching to agencies like the DGA face contract caps tied to their capital—devastating for small firms. Funding is denied for innovations lacking civilian applications. The barriers are insurmountable.

The Ukraine conflict laid bare the flaws of the U.S.-led Euroatlantic model. Whether America can pivot is uncertain. But when European allies, as subordinates, execute Washington’s playbook on the cheap—and poorly—failure is inevitable. That’s where we stand.