French Tango in Bucharest

The pas-de-deux between France and RFI Romania presses on. Let’s unravel the tale of a well orchestrated electoral manipulation.

This analysis results from a cooperation between Stéphane Luçon, a French journalist based in Romania, and L’Eclaireur.

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How many more rhetorical pirouettes will Radio France Internationale (RFI) Romania and French diplomats perform to mask France’s meddling in Romanian affairs? A recent interview with French Ambassador Nicolas Warnery, conducted by RFI Romania’s editor-in-chief, reveals they’ll keep spinning as long as Paris pulls the strings. In a swift, self-assured performance, Warnery delivered a masterclass in evasion. With unwavering confidence, he asserted that President Iohannis had squarely blamed Russia for alleged interference in the first round of Romania’s 2024 presidential elections.

Brandishing the French Viginum¹ report as undeniable evidence, he deflected scrutiny with ease. To top it off, Warnery brushed off accusations of French “colonialism” in Romania as mere Russian propaganda, deftly dodging any examination of France’s actions.

Iohannis's Confession in Brussels

"And then there was a support [from France], explicit support when the [Romanian] President of the Republic, on January 6th, said 'it's a Russian hybrid attack.' He clearly attributed the origin of the hybrid attack to Russia," Ambassador Warnery asserted. Problem: this is completely false.

When questioned by a Romanian journalist about the attribution of interference, Klaus Iohannis had actually declared the opposite in December:

We know what happened, but diplomatic protocol makes it tricky to point fingers and say, "You’re the culprit." What you’re really asking is whether there’s an attribution process—that’s the term for it. In the murky world of cyberspace, pinning blame for malicious acts is no simple task. It demands concrete, irrefutable evidence, which is notoriously hard to come by in the digital realm. Consider this: one cyberattack was traced to a state, but the investigation to confirm that attribution dragged on for four years.

In other words: no tangible proof, and no attribution, to use the technical term...

This certainly didn't prevent Iohannis from continuing thus:

The orchestrated nature of these attacks—the synchronized assault on TikTok accounts traced to Russia, the simultaneous strikes on vote-counting servers, all deftly repelled—reveals a scale and sophistication far beyond the reach of lone actors, groups, or political factions. Only a state actor could pull off such a complex, far-reaching operation. In the shadowy world of intelligence, these patterns are unmistakable, and they point directly to Russia.

We’re still miles away from the "clear attribution" boasted by the French ambassador. The analytical leap to pin blame, made as early as December, feels more like a brazen jump than a reasoned conclusion.

Analogy as Proof

When pinning blame proves elusive, vague similarities are trotted out as evidence. Yet astroturfing—the art of faking grassroots trends on social media—is a tactic routinely wielded by private actors, not just state players.

Seven months on, the reliance on this "analogical" reasoning betrays the flimsiness of the case. At the July 2025 Defense Council, Romanian authorities were stuck in the same rut: "We’re certain, by analogy, that Russia did it, but we’ve got no proof," as HotNews reported on July 14—the same day the French ambassador spun his first deft deflection on RFI Romania. Romanian media also note that Defense Council members admitted tracing the culprit would demand "a sprawling operation spanning years."

For now, we’re simply asked to swallow the narrative that the real winners of the 2024-2025 electoral circus are the same parties that have gripped Romania’s transition for 35 years, alongside their European allies. By annulling an election whose outcome didn’t suit them, they’ve clung to power, leaving us to question the cost to democracy.

Viginum and Its Hollow, Circular References

Emboldened by delivering his initial falsehood unchallenged, the ambassador doubles down with flair: "Then came the Viginum report, a meticulous analysis by France’s expert agencies, conducted before the Prime Minister’s review, and, naturally, with the collaboration of Romanian authorities."

In truth, the Viginum report is little more than a repackaged version of Romanian analyses, as it admits on its opening page, relying solely on public information and data without conducting an independent investigation. Strikingly, it omits any mention of the National Liberal Party’s (PNL) campaign to boost Călin Georgescu—the candidate barred from Romania’s presidential election—despite Romanian tax authorities tracing payments to influencers, as uncovered by the press.

This omission is glaring. The PNL, tied to former President Klaus Iohannis, fueled Georgescu’s campaign, propelling him to such prominence that the election was annulled under the guise of foreign interference. This allowed Iohannis to cling to power past his term, only stepping down under the shadow of impeachment threats. His exit paved the way for Ilie Bolojan, a PNL ally, to serve as interim president before becoming Prime Minister under the new president, Nicușor Dan, after the 2025 election rerun.

Is it too much to expect Viginum to acknowledge the role of Romania’s establishment parties in amplifying Georgescu’s TikTok campaign? Or should we infer that the French state’s resources are primarily deployed to bolster the interests of Emmanuel Macron’s political allies in the European Parliament? Regardless, French diplomacy appears to tacitly endorse the entrenchment of Romania’s “system parties” as they solidify their grip on the hijacked election.

Two Theories on the Origin of the Georgescu Vote

Turning to the sovereignist surge and Călin Georgescu’s triumph in the first round of Romania’s 2024 presidential election, two plausible theories emerge, grounded in evidence rather than analogical guesswork.

Theory #1: The Manipulation Operation That Went Wrong

One compelling theory points to a manipulation campaign that spectacularly backfired. The establishment parties, eager to neutralize George Simion, the Alliance for Romanian Unity (AUR) candidate threatening their dominance, quietly propped up Călin Georgescu to split the sovereignist vote. Their plan was to dilute Simion’s support, ensuring “system” candidates sailed into the second round. But the scheme derailed catastrophically: instead of scraping by with 8-10% as intended, Georgescu surged to first place with over 20% of the vote, poised to clinch the presidency. A poll even projected him at 60% when, on December 6, 2024, the Constitutional Court abruptly halted voting already underway among Romania’s diaspora.

Panicked, the orchestrators scrapped the entire election. Subversion is like a nuclear reactor: fail to keep it subcritical, and it explodes in your face.

Theory #2: The Turnaround of the Sovereignist Vote

A second theory, which may complement the first, points to a dramatic shift in the sovereignist vote from George Simion to Călin Georgescu, fueled by a relentless disinformation campaign targeting the Alliance for Romanian Unity (AUR) leader.

Unlike the digital-heavy strategies of most parties, AUR waged a tireless grassroots campaign: bustling markets, handing out books and posters, countless handshakes, and selfies with supporters. They even launched a medical caravan to serve Romania’s healthcare deserts, providing dental care, cancer screenings, and consultations—all funded by the Party’s public subsidies, which AUR proudly declared they’d rather invest in Romanians’ health than splashy ad campaigns. Yet, this groundswell of support may have been undermined by a barrage of falsehoods that swayed voters toward Georgescu.