The Era of The Neo-Mercenary
The increasing use of private military companies by goverments is a lasting trend. Valère Llobet provides a comprehensive look at a thriving industry amid global security challenges.
While mercenarism may be one of the oldest trades in history, the rise of private military companies (PMCs) is a modern phenomenon, reflecting the evolving nature of global dynamics.
This industry often captures the public’s imagination, blending highly skilled professionals with more questionable entities. For instance, the Comya Group, led by Alexandre Benalla (Emmanuel Macron’s former unofficial head of security), has drawn attention for its partnership with Ukraine’s Omega Consulting Group, a PMC criticized for its ties to far-right extremist networks, including neo-Nazi elements.
Valère Llobet, a research fellow at the French Intelligence Research Center (CF2R) and PhD candidate at Grenoble Alpes University, provides critical insights into this contentious sector. His new book, Private Wars: Military Companies Storming the World (Editions du Cerf), examines the rapid growth of PMCs and its complex implications. In this interview, Llobet offers a balanced perspective on an industry that increasingly shapes global security.
L'Éclaireur: Let’s start by exploring the history of private military companies (PMCs). This phenomenon didn’t start with Blackwater. More importantly, how do PMCs differ from traditional mercenarism?
Valère Llobet: The origins of PMCs can be traced to just before World War II with the Flying Tigers, a U.S.-backed initiative. A private entity was created to hire American military pilots, officially discharged from service, to support China against Japanese forces. This marked the earliest form of a PMC.
This model evolved into Air America…
L'Éclaireur: That later led to Southern Air Transport, implicated in arms trafficking during the Iran-Contra affair…
Valère Llobet: Precisely. Southern Air Transport was part of the same framework. From its founding, the CIA acquired airlines, including in Taiwan, to build Air America, which played a critical role in covert operations.
Post-World War II, the British faced challenges as their colonial empire unraveled, with the loss of India and the Suez Crisis setback alongside France and Israel. During the North Yemen conflict, where royalist loyalists rebelled against the pro-Egyptian regime, the British were unable to deploy regular forces. They turned to David Stirling, the SAS founder, who was brought out of retirement.
Stirling launched Watchguard International Limited, the first modern PMC. It recruited extensively, including figures like Bob Denard1, a French veteran merc in Africa. Denard soon departed, as the Anglo-Saxon model—focused on commercial services rather than direct combat—didn’t suit him. Watchguard established key features of modern PMCs: competitive salaries, ties to intelligence and military communities, and commercial ventures like equipment sales.
Watchguard eventually wound down, but other firms emerged. Stirling founded additional companies, such as Kilo Alpha Service, active in southern Africa. The post-Cold War era saw further growth, with companies like MPRI and the infamous South African Executive Outcomes, the first PMC to gain media prominence.
Inspired by British and South African successes, the U.S. expanded its PMC sector, culminating in 2003 with the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and Blackwater’s rise. Another pivotal figure was Tim Spicer, the Bristich founder of Aegis and a forerunner to Blackwater’s Erik Prince. Spicer maintained close ties to the Thatcher government, particularly through her son.
L'Éclaireur: There was the infamous failed coup attempt in Guinea…
Valère Llobet: Yes, Spicer was implicated in that unsuccessful coup alongside associates.
L'Éclaireur: They were arrested, including Thatcher’s son, correct?
Valère Llobet: Indeed, but they were quickly released, likely due to Margaret Thatcher’s influence. Those were yet traditional mercenary operations.
By 2003, PMCs didn’t suddenly proliferate—they had existed for decades—but public awareness surged, driven by scandals like Abu Ghraib, where U.S. military and CIA personnel faced human rights violation allegations, and Blackwater’s Nisour Square incident. These events spotlighted PMCs’ role in modern conflicts.
To address your second question, the distinction between mercenaries and PMCs is critical. Mercenaries, like Bob Denard’s groups, are primarily combatants, often driven by ideological or personal motives, serving states or private entities directly on the battlefield. PMCs, by contrast, are legally registered commercial enterprises with fiscal and regulatory obligations. They provide military-related services—security, training, logistics, or escorts—tasks once handled by state militaries.
PMCs emphasize their legitimacy, operating under contracts with traceable documentation, unlike mercenaries who may fight on frontlines for conflicting sides in civil wars. However, boundaries blur when PMCs, like Blackwater, engage in offensive operations, such as CIA-backed missions. This has led to terms like “neo-mercenaries,” reflecting how some PMCs mirror traditional mercenarism behind a corporate veneer.
L'Éclaireur: Support functions are the core business of these companies, but major players like DynCorp have played massive roles in Afghanistan and Iraq, to the point where the U.S. military and NATO rely on them…
Valère Llobet: This reflects the broader trend of privatization, creating a degree of dependency. DynCorp, a longstanding player in U.S. policy since the Clinton era, predates the Iraq War. Like MPRI, it maintains deep ties to the U.S. governement.
The public-private nexus is crucial. In Iraq, Aegis exemplified this by creating a scheme where PMCs protected other PMCs. After Blackwater personnel were killed in Fallujah, Aegis developed an QRF network across U.S. PMC operational zones. The contract was enormous.
While some PMCs adhere to international law, Aegis was primarily profit-driven. Training contracts for Afghan military and police raised questions, as some firms may have benefited from prolonging these programs indefinitely…
Anglo-Saxon nations have a strong tradition of leveraging PMCs. In intelligence privatization, the Office of Special Plans, a U.S. Department of Defense unit, is a telling case. It produced the 2003 report presented by Colin Powell to the UN to justify the invasion of Iraq, relying heavily on private actors who later secured lucrative contracts.
Today, PMCs are deeply involved in intelligence, from open-source monitoring to subcontracted missions, as seen in Ukraine. The Kaki Group, previously linked to Abu Ghraib— some of its employees faced recent convictions—now supports U.S. Special Forces Command and operates in Ukraine.
The Office of Special Plans bypassed agencies like the CIA, which had dismissed claims of active Iraqi nuclear programs or weapons of mass destruction. The Bush administration went as far as penalizing officials challenging the official narrative, with pressure extending to their families.
The Yellowcake affair and Curveball, a German BND2 agent exposed as a fraud, underscored these issues, as did the outing of CIA officer Valerie Plame after her husband, Ambassador Joseph Wilson, opposed the Iraq invasion. These cases highlight how private actors circumvented official channels.
The U.S. public-private intelligence link dates to the U.S. Civil War, with the North contracting Pinkerton. Today, PMCs like Kaki Group provide direct intelligence to military commands, alongside smaller, sometimes non-U.S. firms.
As global challenges grow more complex, intelligence agencies rely on private specialists, particularly in cyber, where private actors dominate.
In France, the approach differs. The term PMC is avoided, with ESSD (Enterprises de Services de Sécurité et de Défense) preferred. Companies like Amarante and Geos, among others, often operate with DGSE backing. ESSDs and intelligence services collaborate closely, and a PMC operating without state approval would face significant obstacles.
Only one French firm, Secopec, openly identified as a PMC; its director was assassinated in Libya in an unresolved case. Today, France hosts numerous ESSDs, including newer firms like Chiron Solutions, whose director is a public figure. They provided services in Ukraine, such as exfiltrations early in the conflict.
France maintains stringent oversight of PMCs, prompting some to establish companies abroad, such as in the UK or US, where regulations are less restrictive. A notable case is the Comya Group, founded in the UK by Alexandre Benalla3. This firm operates in Africa, Sudan, and Ukraine, recently partnering with a Ukrainian PMC.
This Ukrainian entity, Omega Consulting Group, has openly displayed neo-Nazi symbols in its communications, including NATO and EU flags alongside individuals with tattoos like “death to Jews,” Totenkopf insignia (historically linked to German military units, notably the SS), and Black Sun symbols (a Nazi mystical emblem). This highlights the darker aspects of the PMC industry.
L'Éclaireur: Ukraine serves as a critical example. Advanced Western weapons supplied to Ukraine are not operated by Ukrainians, due to their lack of expertise and restricted access to operational codes. Who handles these systems—NATO troops, active-duty military, PMCs, or a hybrid model where personnel transition from military to private roles?
Valère Llobet: France’s ESSDs provide essential services to the state and private companies under rigorous oversight. The 2003 law on mercenary activities and the 2023 military programming law, particularly Article 42, tightly regulate former military personnel. While morally commendable, these restrictions limit ESSD growth.
Conversely, former French military personnel, including ex-legionnaires, have been involved in training Chinese PMCs or joining PMCs in conflicts like Yemen. A current trial involves individuals accused of participating in a PMC’s efforts to assassinate Yemeni officials for the UAE.
In Ukraine, PMCs from Russia, Ukraine (e.g., Omega Consulting Group), and the West operate. The Mozart Group, a U.S.-based PMC, positioned itself as a counter to Russia’s Wagner Group. Both have clashed, including through legal battles over financial misconduct.
The Mozart Group marketed itself as a humanitarian organization, using crowdfunding and emotionally charged social media campaigns featuring distressed civilians and animals. However, it was a registered U.S. LLC, and its founder acknowledged CIA contacts in an interview.
This reflects a broader pattern of deception in the shadow war. PMCs offer states plausible deniability—a key political advantage—allowing governments to distance themselves from controversial actions by claiming, “It’s not us.”
On the Russian side, PMCs are illegal, yet Wagner operates with state utility. Wagner’s predecessor, Slavonic Corp, saw its members arrested by the FSB upon returning from Syria, citing Russia’s legal framework. This underscores the concept of raison d’état, where states prioritize strategic interests over legal constraints, as Cioran noted: “Law is the realm of the imaginary.”
This raises challenges in controlling organizations, even state actors, that may operate unlawfully. Many nations now implement parliamentary oversight of intelligence services, a response to past CIA excesses in assassinations and regime destabilization, curtailed by President Ford.
Modern intelligence operations favor subtler influence through entities like USAID or NGOs, as seen in color revolutions like Maidan. These methods are discreet and effective compared to overt actions like supporting Pinochet’s coup against Allende, which drew global attention.
In today’s era of ubiquitous cameras and microphones, covert mercenary operations risk exposure. Influence campaigns, harder to attribute, allow states to deflect responsibility by framing them as expressions of free opinion. This reflects raison d’état, a concept traceable to Antigone’s moral dilemmas.
L'Éclaireur: Isn’t there a French state-affiliated company providing training and similar services? I can’t recall its name…
Valère Llobet: You’re referring to DCI, which isn’t a PMC but was an EPIC, a public industrial and commercial entity under the Ministry of Defense. Recently, DCI was privatized and sold to the ADIT group, a leader in economic intelligence, though it retains some public ownership.
Regarding advanced weapons systems in Ukraine, speculation abounds, but concrete details are scarce amid the fog of war. Intelligence services, special forces, and private actors likely provide training and support for sophisticated equipment. Definitive evidence on their roles will emerge in time.
Plausible deniability remains a cornerstone of PMC utility, rooted in U.S. legal concepts allowing officials to disavow knowledge of subordinates’ actions. As depicted in Mission: Impossible, operatives are told the government will deny involvement if they’re captured. This enables states to use private actors while maintaining distance, a tactic employed by Russia with Wagner, the U.S. with various PMCs, and in Ukraine, where The Mozart Group claims independent action driven by moral outrage.
L'Éclaireur: How does the PMC industry function outside the Western world?
Valère Llobet: The privatization of essential state functions—defense, security, and intelligence—through private military companies is a dynamic and expanding global sector. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan highlighted the value of PMCs, inspiring many nations to develop their own firms to enhance security and influence.
Historically, PMCs have cast a wide net for recruitment. In Latin America, Anglo-Saxon companies, particularly American ones, long held market dominance, recruiting extensively from local armed forces and intelligence agencies. Some personnel were linked to South American authoritarian regimes, raising ethical concerns.
While Russia’s PMC activities are frequently noted, Turkey has emerged as a significant player with the Sadat group, though it competes with another Turkish firm, EEKOL. These entities, financially supported by state actors like Qatar, align with President Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman strategy to extend Turkish influence across Muslim-majority nations.
China has also risen as a powerhouse in the PMC sector. Erik Prince, previously of Blackwater, contributed to the creation of the Frontier Services Group, catalyzing the growth of Chinese PMCs.
This has fostered a competitive global market, with diverse service offerings and pricing models. Chinese PMCs, for example, provide cost-effective alternatives to their Anglo-Saxon counterparts.
L'Éclaireur: Are their primary clients private corporations?
Valère Llobet: Chinese PMCs are integrated into the Belt and Road Initiative. China’s longstanding doctrine of military non-interference—its armed forces rarely operate abroad and haven’t engaged in conventional warfare since the 1979 Vietnam conflict—shapes this approach. To preserve diplomatic relations, China avoids deploying its military to secure overseas investments or protect its citizens.
Instead, it has established PMCs along the Belt and Road’s maritime and terrestrial corridors. In Africa, Chinese PMCs are a fixture wherever Chinese investments, such as mines or railway projects, are located. These firms currently operate in 32 African nations, providing critical security support for China’s extensive economic engagements.
Legendary French Mercenary
Bundesnachrichtendienst, the German foreign intelligence agency
Former unofficial head of Security for president Emmanuel Macron, sentences to one year in jail and still invistigated in a corruption case involving a contract with a Russian oligarch whilehe was employeed by the Elysée palace.